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Sammendrag 
Økt fedrekvote kan føre til varige endringer i spesialisering, samlivsstabilitet og videre barnefødsler 
for par med barn. Vi undersøker denne hypotesen i et kvasieksperimentelt design. Vi bruker en 
utvidelse av den norske fedrekvoten fra 6 til 10 uker, innført i 2009, som kilde til tilfeldig variasjon i 
permisjonslengde. Data er hentet fra administrative registre, og inkluderer par som fikk barn i et vindu 
på fire måneder rundt implementeringsdatoen 1. juli (N=9 757). Ved hjelp av et regresjons-
diskonituitetsdesign sammenlikner vi par som fikk barn rett før og rett etter at reformen ble 
implementert. Logikken bak et slikt design er at det ikke finnes systematiske forskjeller mellom 
parene som fikk barn rett før og rett etter reformen, og at eventuelle endringer i spesialiseringen, 
samlivsstabiliteten og/eller videre barnefødsler derfor vil være drevet av forskjelellen i 
permisjonslengde og ikke av andre egenskaper ved parene. 
 
Resultatene viser at reformen gir en umiddelbar økning i fedres permisjonslengde på omtrent tre uker, 
mens mødre reduserer sin permisjonslengde. Dette er en betydelig endring i permisjonsuttak som gjør 
det mulig å studere effekter av lengre pappapermisjon på andre utfall.  
 
Til tross for denne endringen finner vi at verken hennes heller hans inntekt de neste årene blir 
signifikant påvirket av reformen, og det gjør heller ikke samlivsstabilitet og barnefødsler. Dette gjelder 
for både samboende of gifte par. Våre funn går derfor inn i en litteratur som jevnt over viser få effekter 
av endringer i fedrekvotens lengde. 
1 Introduction
Newer theoretical contributions have suggested that a deﬁcit of gender equality in families can
reduce family well-being and, in turn, union stability and fertility (Goldscheider et al., 2015;
Cooke, 2006; Esping-Andersen and Billari, 2015). The proposed mechanism is that women
suﬀer under a double burden of paid and unpaid work, and when this burden is alleviated,
both union stability and parity progression may recuperate. This proposition is corroborated
by studies showing that lower father involvement is associated with lower female relationship
satisfaction (Kaufman, 2000; Barstad, 2014) and lower union stability (Ruppanner et al., 2017;
Sigle-Rushton, 2010; Amato, 2007) . Speciﬁcally, in Norway, Sweden and Iceland, longer pater-
nity leave correlates with both higher union stability (Lappegård et al., 2019) and higher risks
of second births (Duvander et al., 2016a). As fathers who are more committed to their partner
may both spend more time on care work and be likely to want another child, these associations
need not indicate a causal relationship.
Gender equal and stable parental unions, as well as fertility levels hindering rapid population
decline, are considered politically desired. While the division of unpaid work is outside the realm
of state regulations, state compensated paternity leave may constitute a rare opportunity for
policy inﬂuence. Many countries have policies in place that incentivize fathers' participation in
paid parental leave programs, often referred to as a father quotas or daddy quotas (see e.g.
Patnaik (2016) for an overview). The introduction of paternity quotas eﬀectively increase both
the share of fathers taking leave and the number of leave days taken by fathers (cf. Cools et al.
2015 for Norway; Ekberg et al. 2013 for Sweden; Geisler and Kreyenfeld 2012 for Germany;
Patnaik 2016 for Canada). There is no consistent evidence that such quotas equalize earnings,
yet our knowledge on their importance for demographic processes remain scarce.
This paper extends our knowledge on eﬀects of paternity quotas by aiming to causally estab-
lish whether a government-induced extension of an existing paternity quota has consequences
for the union stability and fertility of couples aﬀected. We take advantage of an extension of the
Norwegian paternity quota from 6 to 10 weeks, which took eﬀect for parents of children born
July 1, 2009 and onwards. The reform added two weeks to the total parental leave period, and
shifted two weeks from the shared period to the period reserved for the father (NAV, 2015b)1,
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incentivizing fathers to increase their time at home by four weeks and mothers to decrease their
time at home by two weeks.
We expand upon previous literature in two main ways. First, most previous studies focus
on introdution of quotas, to which immediate response is typically a minority behavior. For
instance, the 1993 introduction in Norway raised uptake from 3 to 25 per cent, meaning that
leave-taking remained a minority behavior among fathers also (immediately) after the intro-
duction (Cools et al., 2015). In contrast, 3 in 4 fathers were already taking some parental
leave at the time of the 2009 extension (Fougner, 2012). This normalization of paternity leave
could potentially facilitate a larger immediate reform response, and subsequently lead to more
profound changes in parents' behavior than had we only observed families with the most ded-
icated fathers. A growing literature on eﬀects of introduction of paternity qoutas cannot tell
us whether such non-linear responses exist. Qualitative studies indicate that fathers who take
paternity quotas of this length indeed spend most of their time caring for their child alone, and
that they consider this a learning experience that permantently strengthens the bond between
themselves and their child (Østbakken et al., 2018).
Regarding outcomes, eﬀects of (the introduction of) paternity quotas on market work are
by now well documented. Of equal importance, yet substantially less studied, is the eﬀect of
paternity leave on demographic processes. While gender equality is repeatedly suggested to
be important for fertility, empirical tests of this proposition with good causal identiﬁcation is
remarkably rare. The potential of long paternity quotas in stabilizing parental unions is also
clearly understudied, particularly with respect to the statistically less stable cohabiting unions.
Cools et al. (2015) ﬁnd no signiﬁcant eﬀects of the introduction of the four-week paternity quota
in Norway in 1993 on marital stability when the focal child is 14 years old. In contrast, Avdic and
Karimi (2018) ﬁnd that the introduction of the Swedish paternity quota reduced union stability
among low-earning couples. We expand upon the previous Norwegian study both by including
the more fragile cohabiting unions (Hart et al., 2017; Lyngstad and Jalovaara, 2010), potentially
more easily moved, and by investigating if a paternity leave of longer duration has more profound
eﬀects on union stability. Regarding fertility, to the best of our knowledge, the only example of
a causal design to identify eﬀects of father involvement on fertility to date is Cools et al. (2015).
They ﬁnd that the introduction of the Norwegian paternity quota has no signiﬁcant eﬀects on
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the probability of having another joint child. In contrast, Farré and González (2017) utilize
the implementation of a two-weeks father's quota in Spain in a regression discontinuity design
and ﬁnd that (short) paternity leave delay childbearing and reduce higher-order births among
women above 35.
To estimate the eﬀect of the extension of the father's quota on leave uptake, union stabil-
ity and fertility we employ a Regression Discontinuity design  an identiﬁcation strategy very
unlikely to be biased by gradual changes in fathering practices over time. We compare couples
with children born just before the extension of the father's quota to couples who had a child
just after this date. For precise estimation of eﬀects for these relatively small subgroups, the
sample size provided by full population data is crucial. Our main study sample consists of 9 757
parental couples who were coresiding prior to pregnancy, and where the mother was employed
the year before the focal child was born (excluding most mothers not eligible for paid parental
leave). We test empirically whether the reform did in fact change the pattern of parental leave
uptake for mothers and fathers. All outcome variables are drawn from administrative registers,
ensuring zero attrition and high validity. Binwidth is estimated empirically in a local linear
regression, yet constrained to be equal at each side of the cutoﬀ. To better understand mech-
anisms driving eﬀects (or the absence thereof), we also estimate eﬀects on the labor supply
of fathers and mothers at the intensive and extensive margin, as well as her share of couple
earnings. A decrease in fathers' earnings can be (and often is) interpreted as a(nother) sign of
his increased eﬀorts in unpaid work, and hence a desired policy outcome given the underlying
goal of increasing gender equality. However, we note that a negative eﬀect on his earnings also
will emerge if extended paternity leave signals lower work commitment, leading to subsequent
wage discrimination, i.e. intensiﬁed fatherhood wage penalties.
The results show that the reform induced fathers to immediately increase their leave length
by three weeks. Mothers signiﬁcantly reduced their number of leave days with up to 21 days,
yet the exact length of this reduction is somewhat sensitive to speciﬁcation. Despite this con-
siderable change in leave uptake, we do, however, not ﬁnd signiﬁcant eﬀects on union stability
or subsequent fertility. Measures of market work are also unmoved. A battery of robustness
checks, including a placebo reform, supports a causal interpretation of our results. Our results
yield little support to the potential of policy-induced father involvement to stabilize unions and
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increase fertility. As such, they accentuate the potential importance of selection in producing
the previously observed associations between father involvement on one side, and union stability
and high fertility on the other.
Our results have important implications for policy. They do not support the notion of larger
and more stable families as a welcome, yet unintended side eﬀect of paternity quotas. To the
extent that paternal involvement in other forms is expected to aﬀect demographic outcomes, our
results call for a careful evaulation on such expectations in a plausibly causal design. Equally
important, however, our results suggests that fathers who were moved by the reform to stay
out of the labor market for an extended period of time experienced no (increased) fatherhood
penalty. Our results indicate that fathers may take prolonged work extensions to care for their
newborn, without fear of facing subsequent earnings penalties.
2 Theoretical framework and previous research
Across Western societies, the birth of a(nother) child fuels gender specialization. Becker (1991,
p. 39) suggests that this process is driven by women's small biological comparative advantage
in nursing and care for newborns, and there is ample evidence that gendered expectations and
norms play a role in manifesting and strengthening specialization (Bittman et al., 2003; Brines,
1994; Hochschild and Machung, 2012; Ono and Raymo, 2006; West and Zimmerman, 1987).
While the negative consequences of specialization for women's career and economic indepen-
dence are obvious, specialization was long expected to increase the gain from marriage and
both stabilize unions and increase fertility (Becker, 1991). Numerous empirical and theoretical
contributions have later challenged that specialization enhances union stability and increases
fertility (Esping-Andersen and Billari, 2015; Goldscheider et al., 2015; Oppenheimer, 1997). In
this section, we ﬁrst explore how paternity leaves may aﬀect the division of paid and unpaid
work in the family, and then turn to the potential impact of paternity leave on union stability
and fertility.
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2.1 Paternity leave and gender specialization
If gender specialization is a cumulative or self-strengthening process, as suggested by Becker
(1991), increasing fathers' participation in non-market work after the birth of a child can have
a lasting impact on division of paid and unpaid work in the family. Increasing the length of
fathers' parental leave may counteract the process of specialization in several ways, e.g. by
enabling mothers to return to paid work sooner, by reducing her human capital depreciation,
and/or by improving fathers' domestic skills. If an extended father's quota increases the fa-
ther's skills in home production, the process of specialization may be then slowed down or even
stopped. In support of this, Rehel (2014) ﬁnds that fathers acquired both new domestic skills
and strengthened their emotional bonds with children after about one month of parental leave.
Similarly, using a resource-bargaining perspective, Lundberg and Pollak (1996) suggest that
strengthening of non-market skills among fathers and market skills among mothers lead to last-
ing, de-specializing impacts of the division of labor within families. Both the bonding between
father and child and the acquisition of household skills can be stronger if fathers spend their
leave without the presence of the mother, who in most cases holds a comparative advantage in
house and childcare work.
Numerous studies have assessed the relationship between paternity leave and various family
and child outcomes (see e.g. Schober 2014; Patnaik 2016; Østbakken et al. 2018 for reviews),
and their ﬁndings primarily conﬁrm that higher uptake of paternity leave is correlated with a
more equal division of paid and domestic work. A small number of quasi-experimental studies
address the de-specializing and earnings-equalizing potential of implementing father's quotas.
Supporting the idea of de-specialization, some studies ﬁnd positive eﬀects on fathers' participa-
tion in child care (Cools et al., 2015; Schober, 2014) and house work (Kotsadam and Finseraas,
2011; Patnaik, 2016), and increases in mothers' labor supply (Kluve and Tamm, 2013; Patnaik,
2016). Meanwhile, other studies report negative eﬀects on mothers' earnings (Cools et al., 2015)
and labor supply (Ekberg et al., 2013), and increases in mothers' time spent on child care (Pat-
naik, 2016). Yet again, most studies ﬁnd no causal eﬀect on neither fathers' (Cools et al., 2015;
Ekberg et al., 2013) nor mothers' (Rege and Solli, 2013) income, fathers' labor supply (Cools
et al., 2015; Ekberg et al., 2013; Kluve and Tamm, 2013; Patnaik, 2016), or fathers' (Ekberg
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et al., 2013; Kluve and Tamm, 2013; Schober, 2014) or mothers' (Schober, 2014) participation
in child care or house work.
Notably, for Norway Rege and Solli (2013) identify a substantial negative eﬀect of the 1993
introduction of the father's quota on fathers' earnings using a diﬀerence-in-diﬀerence design 
though only after a phase-in-period. In contrast, Cools et al. (2015) ﬁnd no (negative) eﬀects
on father's earnings of the same reform. While Rege and Solli (2013) argue convincingly that
one can only expect an eﬀect when a larger proportion of fathers is moved by the reform,
their identiﬁcation strategy is also more vulnerable to bias from trends over time than that of
Cools et al. (2015). Finally, Østbakken et al. (2018) analyze the eﬀect of the Norwegian 2009
expansion of the paternity quota on a range of labor market related outcomes using a diﬀerence-
in-diﬀerence design. They ﬁnd that while the reform increased father's leave uptake, it did not
permanently aﬀect labor market outcomes. An exception is a small negative eﬀect on mother's
earnings in the short run, which they interpret as an increase in unpaid leave as a response to
shorter paid parental leave.
2.2 Paternity leave and union stability
According to Amato (2007), conﬂict over unpaid work is among the major sources of marital
dissatisfaction. Greenstein (2009) ﬁnds that a traditional division of unpaid labor is associated
with lower relationship satisfaction for women in countries where men and women tend to share
paid work. This pattern is conﬁrmed in single country studies showing a negative association
between traditional division of unpaid labor and women's relationship satisfaction (see e.g.
Frisco and Williams (2003); Kaufman (2000) and Stevens et al. (2001) for the US; Kluwer et al.
(1996) for the Netherlands; Barstad (2014) for Norway; Oláh and Gähler (2014) for Sweden).
Men's eﬀorts at home is also associated with lower union dissolution risk (Cooke (2006) for US;
Sigle-Rushton (2010) for the UK; Ruppanner et al. (2017) for Sweden). Oláh and Gähler (2014)
ﬁnd that the combination of a gender equal ideology with a gender traditional practice lowers
union stability among young Swedish coresidential couples. Similarly, Ruppanner et al. (2017)
ﬁnd that an unequal division of unpaid work is particularly detrimental to union stability if the
extra work is put in by a woman, and not appreciated by her partner. These studies cannot
be interpreted causally, as men who are satisﬁed with their union may be more inclined to do
9
house and care work, and unmeasured characteristics such as personality traits may inﬂuence
both men's housework and union stability. Still, they form the basis of the empirically testable
prediction that his increased eﬀorts at home will stabilize unions.
Mechanisms linking parental leave to increased union stability tend to depend on the parental
leave invoking a lasting change in the division of household labor.2 If the father increases his
eﬀorts at home, the mother's relationship satisfaction may increase, due to increased perceived
fairness of the division of housework, and/or because house- and childcare may be more enjoyable
as a shared than a solitary activity. The idea of perceived unfairness is rooted in equity theory
(Adams 1965, see Lively et al. 2008 for applications to family research), which proposes that
unfair social relationships give a feeling of distress, leading (particularly the discredited) actors
to dissolve them. Of course, it is also possible that a more equal division of household work
reduces relationship quality, to the extent that specialization fosters eﬃciency and this makes
both partners more satisﬁed.
There are few previous studies that address the eﬀect of paternity leave on union stability.
Lappegård et al. 2019 ﬁnd that a (somewhat) longer leave for fathers correlates with union
stability in Norway, Sweden and Iceland (see also Oláh (2001) for a similar result for Sweden
only). The authors acknowledge that this ﬁnding may fully or partly be driven by selection,
i.e. more stable couples sharing leave more equally. Using a regression discontinuity/diﬀerence
in diﬀerence design Cools et al. (2015), ﬁnd no eﬀect of the introduction of the paternity quota
on marital dissolution after 14 years. Data limitations inhibit estimations of eﬀects for the
statistically less stable (Lyngstad and Jalovaara, 2010) cohabiting couples. In contrast, Avdic
and Karimi (2018) ﬁnd using an RD design that the introduction of a paternity quota in Swe-
den temporarily sped up union dissolutions among low-earning couples. In sum, these studies
indicate that the positive relationship between paternity leave uptake and union stability may
be due to selection. However, it is possible that extensions in contexts already favourable to
paternal involvement have more profound eﬀects on union stability.
2.3 Paternity leave and parity progression
To the extent that paternity leave reduces (increases) union stability, it should reduce (increase)
fertility in the short run. However, one may also observe eﬀects on fertility in lieu of eﬀect
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on union dissolution. Following Goldscheider et al. (2015), we expect positive eﬀects of father
involvement to be mediated through two mechanisms. First, father involvement may increase
relationship satisfaction in and of itself, as tasks may be more enjoyable when pursued jointly.
Increased relationship satisfaction may again be positively associated with parity progression.
Second, if his home production facilitates her market production, her opportunity costs of further
childbearing will fall. If her opportunity costs blocked parity progression, fertility will then
increase.
Increased father involvement may also lower fertility, as his increased opportunity cost may
reduce his demand for children. The total eﬀect depends on the size of the reduction in her
opportunity costs relative to the increase in his (see Kravdal (2016) for a similar argument).
Previous studies show that Norwegian men want fewer children than Norwegian women on
average (Lyngstad and Noack, 2005), and that disagreement tends to lead to no further child-
bearing (Thomson, 1997). To the extent that men already tend to hold back family size, shifting
opportunity costs from her to him may further reduce parity progression.
Previous analyses indicate a positive associtation betweeen paternity leave uptake and the
risk of second births (Lappegård (2010) for Norway, Duvander et al. (2016a) for Norway, Sweden
and Iceland). For higher order birth intensities, results are mixed, with a negative relationship
found in Norway and Sweden and no relationship in Iceland (Duvander et al., 2016a; Lappegård,
2010). These studies highlight how selection into paternity leave might explain all or some of the
observed diﬀerences in fertility outcomes. Causal studies of eﬀects of paternity leave on fertility
are rare. Cools et al. (2015) ﬁnd no eﬀects of the paternity quota on fertility after 14 years using
a RD/DD design (see also Duvander et al. (2016b) for a somewhat less rigorous evaluation of the
Norwegian and Swedish father quotas that yield largely the same results, but ﬁnding a temporary
positive eﬀect on fertility among Swedish low income couples). Farré and González (2017) utilize
the implementation of a two-weeks father's quota in a regression discontinuity design in Spain
and ﬁnd that (short) paternity leave delay childbearing and reduce higher-order births among
women aged 36 years or older. As for union dissolution, causal studies hint towards that the
associations between paternity leave and fertility is largely driven by selection. However, again,
there are indications of temporary (tempo) reform eﬀects.
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2.4 Expectations
To form expectations of eﬀects of paternity leave on family dynamics, we constrast two major
perspectives on the relationship between gender equality and family wellbeing. Regarding union
stability, the gender revolution perspective (Goldscheider et al., 2015) suggests that if pater-
nity leave has a lasting impact on the father's eﬀorts at home, it may increase the mother's
relationship satisfaction and stabilize unions. A contrasting expectation, based on the standard
microeconomic model (cf. Becker 1991), is that reduced specialization should reduce the gain
from being in a union, and hence increase dissolution risk.
To the extent that paternity leave inﬂuences union stability, parity progression is likely
aﬀected in the same direction  at least in the short run. Furthermore, if paternity leave per-
manently reduces mother's double burden, and this burden has suppressed parity progression,
parity progression may pace up. However, a permanent increase in his opportunity cost of
childbearing may also reduce his demand for children, and slow down parity progression. If his
demand for children was already lower than hers, the latter mechanism may dominate, and the
total eﬀect will be negative.
As a proxy for changes of division of labor within the family, we estimate eﬀects on various
measures of market work. If the reform permanently strengthens his skills in home production,
this may be reﬂected in weaker eﬀorts in market work and a weaker earnings development.3
If his and her eﬀorts at home are substitutes, an increase in the mother's earnings will follow.
Note that time may be shifted between (pure) leisure and unpaid work. Paid work can remain
unmoved if he does more house- or care work, and she gets more (pure) leisure.
3 Reform details
The Norwegian parental leave system ensures income replacement and job security so employed
parents can care for their new child. With an explicit goal of strengthening the relationship
between father and child, as well as to improve the gender equality in the division of paid and
domestic work between the parents (Norwegian Ministry for Children and the Family (1992) p.
30), the Norwegian government introduced a father's quota on April 1 1993. This policy reserved
four weeks of leave exclusively4 for the father, and divided the parental leave into a mother's
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quota, a father's quota and a period which could be divided freely between the parents. The
duration of all three parts of the parental leave has gone through several changes since 1993,
and the developments are summarized in Table 1. Parents can choose between 80 or 100 percent
income replacement for a correspondingly longer or shorter leave. The social security system
replaces earnings up to a cap of 6G5, but several employers, including the Norwegian public
sector, top up parental leave compensation for incomes above this cap.
As we can see from the table, the father's quota was expanded from the original four weeks
to ﬁve weeks in 2005 and then to six weeks in 2006, with a corresponding one-week expansion in
the total leave period in both these years. In 2009, however, the father's quota was expanded by
four weeks, wherein only two weeks were added to the total leave period and the remaining two
were shifted from the shared leave. This rather substantial policy change prompted a signiﬁcant
political debate, and was criticized for taking leave from the mother and giving it to the
father  an argument that reﬂects the strong tendency for mothers to take all or most of the
shareable leave (Dahl et al., 2014; Fougner, 2012).
All fathers whose child was born on or after the policy implementation date were eligible for
the father's quota, as long as both parents had accumulated individual rights to paid parental
leave. The eligibility criteria for paid parental leave have changed slightly over the period
captured in the table, but for our sample (i.e. those who had a child close to July 1, 2009),
eligibility depended on both parents having pensionable income for at least six out of the ten
months before the child was born. Moreover, it was a requirement that the mother's eligibility
was based on at least 50 percent employment (Norwegian Ministry for Children and the Family
(2009): p.3).
There are requirements to the mother's labor market activity when the father uses the shared
weeks in the paid parental leave, however, this is not the case when the father uses the father's
quota (NAV, 2016). The mother could therefore, if desirable, stay at home together with the
father on either paid holidays, unpaid leave or graded leave (Norwegian Ministry for Children
and the Family (2009): p.3). However, Norwegian vacation legislation (entitling all employees
in full time position to ﬁve weeks of paid vacation a year), combined with the rules on ﬂexible
leave uptake (NAV, 2015a) and the now 10 weeks father's quota, implied that it was impossible
for the mother to stay at home during the entire father's quota without the family experiencing
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a drop in disposable income. It is therefore likely that the 2009 reform increased not only the
number of leave days taken by fathers, but also the number of days that fathers spent alone with
their child. In the qualitative analyses by Østbakken et al. (2018) many fathers highlighted that
spending time alone with their child was important both for the development of domestic skills
and for the opportunity to bond and build a strong and close relationship between father and
child during the leave period (cf. Brandth and Kvande 2003; Brandt and Kvande 2018).
4 Methods and data
4.1 Identiﬁcation strategy
The expansion of the father's quota was implemented July 1 2009, and our empirical strategy
takes advantage of this clear cutoﬀ in eligibility and the fact that families with children born
just before and just after the cut-oﬀ should be very similar. We use the increase in the father's
quota and the reduction in the shared leave as a discontinuous function of the birth date of the
child to capture reform eﬀects. Sharp RD takes the following basic form (Angrist and Pischke,
2014):
Yi=α+ρDi+γf(Zi) +εi
Where α is a constant term, γf(Zi) nets out trends in the assignment variable, Di is a
dummy variable for treatment, and ρ gives the reform eﬀect on the outcome. The equation is
estimated on both uptake and outcome variables using the Stata command rdrobust (Calonico
et al., 2016), which speciﬁes a local linear regression for f(Z) using triangular kernel density
estimation. Binwidth is estimated empirically, by an algorithm optimizing the tradeoﬀ between
less bias (narrower bins) and higher precision (wider bins). Binwidth is constrained to be
identical on both sides of the cutoﬀ. Our identifying assumption is that the speciﬁcation of the
running variable (γf(Zi) ) nets out all variation correlated with the outcome and the running
variable that is not due to the reform. For robustness, we also estimate simpler speciﬁcations
(i.e. treatment dummy alone, and linear and quadratic speciﬁcation of time) (Table A.5). We
also show discontinuity plots with a linear ﬁt at each side of the reform cutoﬀ.
Selection around the cut-oﬀ may compromise identiﬁcation (Tamm, 2013; Cools et al., 2015).
Such self-selection into (or out of) eligibility could happen for two main reasons; by parents
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timing the conception of a child in anticipation of the reform, and by expectant parents with
due dates close to July 1 postponing/speeding up induced births or planned caesarian sections.
Families where the father is more involved in family matters will presumably time the birth to
after the introduction, whereas families where the father is less involved might want to time the
birth to before the introduction. These diﬀerent types of families may diﬀer in factors relevant
for specialization and union stability too. Hence, if such strategic timing exists, comparing
families with children born just before and just after the cut-oﬀ will yield biased results.
The intention to expand the father's quota to ten weeks was declared by the government in
2005 (Soria Moria 2005, p. 43), but the policy and its details (including date of implementation)
was not proposed in the Council of State until April 3 2009 (Stortinget, 2015). This would leave
less than nine months until the implementation, suggesting that strategic timing of conceptions
should not be of major concern.6 Cools et al. (2015) ﬁnd strong evidence of strategic timing of
births two weeks before and after the 1993 introduction of the fathers quota (c.f. Brenn and
Ytterstad (1997)). Using placebo tests (testing for eﬀects on earnings in the year prior to the
reform) we do also ﬁnd some evidence of strategic timing, with high-income couples shifting into
the treatment group. When we exclude parents of children born the 13 days before and the 13
days after the reform, no such evidence remains. Hence, we keep this restriction in our main
analyses.7 We also present donut plots showing how RD estimates change when potential
strategic timers are excluded from the sample (see Appendix Figures A.4 and A.3 for parental
leave outcomes and sociodemographic outcomes respectively).
4.2 Data
Study samples
We base all analyses on data from Norwegian population registers covering the time period
between 2007 and 2016. Our main study sample is women who gave birth to a child in May,
June, July or August 2009. In Section 6, we test if restricting the sample to focal children
born in June and July, or expanding it to focal children born March-October, yields similar
results. Furthermore, it is required that the father and mother lived together as of January 1
2008 (before pregnancy). This restriction implies that treated parents on average have lived
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together for a longer time at the time of conception. We have tested if this inﬂuences the results
by conditioning the sample on coresidence by January 1 2007, giving a more similar relationship
duration requirement (on a relative scale) across treatment and control groups. Reassuringly,
this condition yields similar results (available upon request).
We construct two samples for main analysis, one for sociodemographic outcomes and another
for parental leave outcomes. For both samples we make three further restrictions. First, as we
take interest in gender specialization, same-sex couples are excluded. Second, as an exogenous
proxy for parental leave rights, we include only focal children whose mothers had earnings
the year prior to the reform. Finally, as multiple births give rise to correlated observations,
only one focal child per birth (and parental leave spell) is included in the sample. The ﬁnal
sociodemographic sample consists of 9 757 couples.
Measurement of parental leave outcomes requires one additional restriction, as leave spells
are registered to parents rather than children. Hence, in order to link leave spells to focal
children, we exclude couples who had another child 15 months before or after the focal child
was born (see Appendix II for details), and then assume that any parental leave taken within
15 months is linked to the focal child. Note that this restriction may be problematic if it turns
out that the reform inﬂuences fertility. Excluding children born 15 months after the focal child
may imply that we exclude a higher share of parents if the reform indeed did have a positive
eﬀect on fertility. This will imply that the parental leave sample is endogenously conditioned.
We will pay close attention to this in our estimations. The ﬁnal parental leave sample consists
of 9 516 couples. Descriptives for outcome variables are found in Appendix Table A.2.
For placebo analysis, we construct two samples mirroring the two main analysis samples (i.e.
the socioldemographic sample and the parental leave sample), yet with all criterias shifted one
year: The focal children are born in May, June, July or August 2008, parents must have co-
resided as of January 1 2007, and the mother must be registered with positive earnings in 2007.
Same-sex couples and children born in the 26 days around the placebo cutoﬀ (July 1 2008) are
excluded. The parental leave placebo sample consists of 9 110 couples, the sociodemographic
placebo sample has 9 320 couples. Descriptive statistics for outcomes for both placebo samples
are found in Appendix Table A.6.
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4.2.1 Outcome variables
Measures of parental leave uptake As a ﬁrst step, we establish whether our reform indeed
has an eﬀect on parental leave uptake among mothers and fathers. The main outcome of interest
here is the number of paid leave days taken by the mother and father.8 We also estimate eﬀects
on the number and average length of leave spells taken by the father and mother respectively,
and each parent's propensity to take part time leave.9 Together, these characteristics give an
impression of whether the extended father's quota induced longer uninterrupted paternity leave
spells. The eﬀect on parents' leave uptake, if any, constitutes the mechanism or ﬁrst stage
through which eﬀects on other outcomes are mediated. Descriptive statistics for all outcomes
are shown in Table A.1. Details on the construction of parental leave data are given in Appendix
II.
Union stability Our ﬁrst demographic outcome of interest is union stability, measured yearly
January 1st from 2011 (focal child one year old) to 2015 (focal child ﬁve years old). For each
year, we construct a dummy variable taking the value one if the parental couple is still registered
as living together, otherwise zero (see Appendix Table A.1 for descriptives). Unions are dissolved
by registration of separate addresses. This register measure ensures zero attrition, crucial for
the validity of our results. The death of one partner is a rare case of union dissolution among
couples with young children, and unlikely to be inﬂuenced by parental leave uptake, and we
hence consider it unlikely to bias our results. Descriptives for outcome variables are found in
Appendix Table A.1.
Fertility Our second demographic outcome is subsequent fertility, that is, whether the focal
child has younger sibling(s). We construct variables for the cumulative number of younger
siblings born before the focal child's ﬁrst (2010), second, third, fourth and ﬁfth (2014) birthdays.
Based on these count variables, we construct dummies for having at least one younger sibling
within the same time frames.
Earnings Our starting point of the analyses of changes in market work is the sum of earned
income and primary and secondary business income (yrkesinntekt) (Steinkellner, 2003), an
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even better proxy of eﬀorts in paid work than earned income alone. For brevity, we refer to
this variable as earnings. Missing and zero earnings are set to 1, facilitating calculation of log
earnings. We estimate eﬀects both on the extensive margin (as captured by a dummy variable
taking one if earnings exceed 1G, otherwise zero  see endnote 4) and the intensive margin (log
earnings), for both mothers and fathers. Earnings are measured from 2010 (when focal child
turns one years, and one parent is typically still on paid parental leave) to 2014 (when focal
child turns ﬁve years). As paid parental leave is classiﬁed as earnings, parental leave with a
subsequent child will not cause a drop in earnings. In addition to estimating eﬀects on mothers'
and fathers' earnings separately, we construct a measure for specialization in market work by
dividing her earnings by the sum of her and his earnings.10 An increase in this outcome means
a shift towards a less traditional division of labor in the couple.
4.2.2 Control variables and subsample stratiﬁcation
While a valid regression discontinuity design does not require inclusion of covariates beyond
the running variable, covariates can both sharpen the precision of the estimates and provide
robustness checks. Most importantly, we use information on observable characteristics measured
prior to the reform (in 2008) to conduct subgroup analysis. Based on register information of
marriages, we construct an indicator taking the value one if the parental union is a marriage,
otherwise zero. We also construct a set of dummies for parity of the focal child, distinguishing
between ﬁrst borns, second borns, and later borns (merged to retain subsamples of meaningful
size). We obtain information on educational attainment and enrollment from the National
Educational Database (NUDB). When used as a control variable, educational attainment is
grouped into four levels: Basic (not completed high school), completed high school, higher
education lower degree (BA), and higher education higher degree (MA or PhD). To retain test
strength, we collapse these categories into lower (basic and high school) and higher (higher
and lower degree) for the subsample analysis. Missing information on education is coded as
a separate ﬁfth category. Individuals are deﬁned as students if they have been enrolled in
education for at least one month during the current year. We also conduct subsample analysis
for younger couples (both under age 30 the year the focal child is born) and older couples (at
least one parent aged 30 or above the year the focal child is born). When included as covariates,
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mother's and father's age are each included with a linear and curvilinear term.
5 Results
5.1 Reform eﬀects on leave uptake
The reform incentivizes longer paid leave for fathers, and shorter paid leave for mothers. Eﬀects
on leave uptake are shown in Table 3, Panels A and B. No controls indicate the basic model
with no covariates (beyond the running variable), whereas full controls imply estimates from a
model where all covariates are included. For fathers (Panel A), the estimates show a substantial
increase of about 14 leave days, both statistically signiﬁcant and unaﬀected by inclusion of
covariates. Keeping in mind that the reform increase the number of days reserved for the father
from 30 to 50 days, and that fathers pre-reform on average took 33 paid leave days (Table 2,
Panel A) this is a strong yet plausible increase. A visual RD (Figure 1a) conﬁrms a clear jump
in men's leave days at the cutoﬀ. Furthermore, the percent of fathers who takes 10 weeks of
paid leave or more, increases with 50 percentage points (Table 3 and Figure 1e, right panel),
a massive increase from the pre-reform baseline of 12 percent (Table 2, Panel A). The mean
duration of each of the father's parental leave spells is increased by 12 days, but there is no
signiﬁcant change in the number of spells taken. Neither fathers' propensity to take leave nor
fathers' propensity to take part time leave are signiﬁcantly aﬀected.
The point estimates for mothers (Table 3, Panel B) show that the reform induced an average
reduction in leave length of about 21 days, i.e. by about two weeks more than was incentivized
by the reform. A visual RD for mother's number of leave days (Figure 1b) conﬁrms a clear drop
at the discontinuity. There is an equally large drop in the average duration of the leave spells for
mothers (Figure 1d), suggesting that mothers still tend to use all of their leave in one continuous
break from the labor market. Unsurprisingly, neither the mother's propensity to take leave nor
the average number of parental leave spells are aﬀected.
As fathers earn more than mothers in 3 of 4 couples (Table A.1), 80 per cent compensation
implies a larger income loss (in absolute terms) for a large majority of couples when he takes a
larger share of the leave. As such, the reform strengthens the incentive to choose 100 percent
income compensation, and couples respond to this incentive by decreasing their propensity of
19
taking 80 percent compensation (Table 3, Panel A). In other words, treated couples on average
take fewer (yet better compensated) leave days. This shift to shorter total leave length might
explain why mothers' number of leave days is reduced by more than the two weeks that were
shifted to the father by the reform.
Subsample analysis (Appendix Table 4) show that eﬀects are stronger for both fathers' and
mothers' leave when the focal child is a boy, and statistically signiﬁcant in this group only. 11
Eﬀects on her leave are concentrated among mothers of ﬁrst borns. Both for his and her leave
length, eﬀects are stronger for parents older than 22 years, and statistically signiﬁcant in this
group only. When tested in an interaction model, none of these group diﬀerences are signiﬁcant
at the 10 per cent level.
Taken together these ﬁndings show that the reform had a profound eﬀect on the leave uptake
of both mothers and fathers, conﬁrming the ﬁndings from previous studies on the implementation
of fathers' quotas (Cools et al., 2015; Ekberg et al., 2013; Geisler and Kreyenfeld, 2012; Patnaik,
2016). This substantial shift in the distribution of leave between parents means that the policy
change is well suited to identify causal eﬀects of increased paternal involvement during the ﬁrst
year after the child is born. As we observe changes in the leave uptake of both mothers and
fathers, eﬀects on other outcomes, if any, can be mediated by both fathers' increased time spent
with a young child, and mothers' faster return to work after birth.
5.2 Eﬀects of paternity leave on his and her market work
To further explore whether division of labor in the family was impacted by the reform, we
estimate eﬀects on his and her earned income. While we expect eﬀects (if any) to be mediated
by changes in division of parental leave, we present sharp RD (reduced form) estimates, whose
validity does not hinge on changes in leave length being the only mechanism through which the
reform aﬀects other outcomes. His longer paternity leaves may reduce his earnings in the long
run because he continues to pull more weight at home, and/or faces subsequent discrimination
in the labor market. The combination of his longer and her shorter leave may strengthen her
labor market outcomes.
Our main outcome of interest is (relative) earnings the year the focal child turns ﬁve (Table
3, Panel D). At this age, most Norwegian children are enrolled in a child care center, and a
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more permanent pattern of (absence of) specialization in the family is likely to have settled. A
discontinuity plot (Figure 2c) shows no evidence of a jump in this variable at the reform cutoﬀ.
The point estimates of mother's share of earnings are positive, yet statistically insigniﬁcant. In
other words, the tendency of mothers to provide about 40 percent of the household earnings
remains unchanged throughout the period of observation. We also assess yearly eﬀects up to
the age of ﬁve (Figure 3g), starting in the year the focal child turns one, ﬁnding no signiﬁcant
eﬀects in the preceding years. Our results hence provide convincing evidence that the extension
of the fathers' quota did not change the mother's share of couple earnings.
We explore additionally whether there are eﬀects on his or her earnings at both the intensive
(log earnings) and the extensive margin (the probability of being employed, including on parental
leave from employment) the year the focal child turns ﬁve (Table 3, Panel D). Starting with
the eﬀects on log earnings, point estimates are negative for both fathers and mothers, but never
statistically signiﬁcant from zero. Discontinuity plots show no visual evidence for a discontinuity
for log earnings (Figures 2d and 2e). For eﬀects on his and her propensity to be employed when
the focal child turns ﬁve, estimates are small, insigniﬁcant and close to zero.
In the short run (the years the focal child turns one, two, three and four years) neither log
earnings nor his propensity to be working are signiﬁcantly aﬀected for fathers (Figures 3c and
3e respectively). For mothers (Figure 3f), we ﬁnd no eﬀects on the propensity to be working
in the short run. A statistically signiﬁcant negative eﬀect on log earnings emerges for mothers
the year the focal child turns two, but disappears when the focal child is three and four years
(Figure 3d). This may indicate that as some families respond to a shorter total paid leave with
some unpaid leave or reduced working hours for the mother.12
We have also split the sample by union type, parents' age, mother's education, father's edu-
cation and the sex and parity of the focal child, in order to explore whether these overall ﬁndings
hide heterogeneous policy adaptions in diﬀerent families (Table 5). There is a small tendency for
the reform to reduce specialization in families where the mother has higher education (signiﬁcant
after controls only) (p<0.1). Interestingly, there is also a tendency of reduced specialization if
the mother had at least two children before the focal child (p<0.1). In this group, only 10 per
cent of mothers have another child within ﬁve years. This indicates that the reform may have
lasting eﬀects on despecialization that are masked by specialization due to parity progression
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when the focal child is ﬁrst or second born (and 75 and 24 percent of mothers have another child
within ﬁve years). However, none of these diﬀerences are signiﬁcant at the 10 per cent level.
5.3 Eﬀects on union stability
For union stability, our outcome of interest is whether the parental union is intact in a given
year. As (relative) earnings was not moved by the reform, eﬀects  if any  must run through
mechanisms other than changed division of market work. Eﬀects are estimated for the years the
focal child is one (2010) through ﬁve (2015) years old. Positive estimates indicate a stabilizing
eﬀect. By construction of the sample, all unions are intact as of January 1 2008. Table A.1
shows that while 98 per cent of the parental unions remain intact when the focal child is one,
the proportion gradually decreases to 90 per cent when the focal child is ﬁve.
Sharp RD estimates of the reform eﬀect on the probability of the parental union to be intact
when the focal child is ﬁve are found in Panel C of Table 3. The estimates are negative, but
small and not statistically diﬀerent from zero on the 95 per cent level. This is conﬁrmed by
the lack of a visible change in union stability around the cutoﬀ, as can be observed in Figure
2a. In the short run (focal child aged one through four), point estimates are again small and
statistically insigniﬁcant (Figure 3a).
Mean eﬀects may mask heterogeneity, and we proceed to test for subgroup eﬀects on union
stability (when focal child is ﬁve years old) by splitting the by pre-reform characteristics (Table 6,
upper panel). We ﬁnd a negative eﬀect on union stability among cohabiting couples, marginally
signiﬁcant (p<0.1) before controls, and signiﬁcant (p<0.05) after. However, this estimate is
strongly sensitive to exclusion around the cutoﬀ, and the group diﬀerentials are not consistently
signiﬁcant at the 10 per cent level (results available upon request). Following Avdic and Karimi
(2018), we also test for tempo eﬀects in union dissolution separately by the mother's pre-reform
earnings quintile (Figure A.2), again ﬁnding no eﬀects.
5.4 Eﬀects on parity progression
For parity progression, we investigate eﬀects both on number of younger siblings, and on a
dummy variable for having at least one younger sibling. Descriptive statistics show that 34 per
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cent of the sample has at least one younger sibling at age ﬁve (Table A.1). The average number
of younger siblings at age 5 is 0.37, so that only a minority has more than one sibling. Number
of younger siblings and the propensity to have a younger sibling is measured yearly at the focal
child's birthday, ages one (2010) through ﬁve (2014).
Both for number younger sibling and the propensity of a younger sibling at age ﬁve, reform
eﬀects are negative yet statistically insigniﬁcant (see Table 3, lower panel). Supporting the
absence of eﬀects, we ﬁnd no visual discontinuity at the cutoﬀ in the probability of having
a(nother) sibling within ﬁve years (2b). We note that relatively large standard errors means
that there is a range of eﬀects of meaningful size that we cannot reject. Through ages two to
three years, we see a tendency of a negative eﬀect, i.e. slower parity progression among the
treated (Figure 3b). Yet, these estimates never reach statistical signiﬁcance, and from the focal
child is ﬁve years of age, point estimates are very close to zero.
Finally, we assess subsample eﬀect on the probability of having at least one younger sibling
at age ﬁve (Table 6, lower panel). The propensity to have an additional sibling varies strongly
with parity, with 75 per cent of ﬁrst borns, 24 per cent of second borns and 10 per cent of third
or higher order having an additional sibling within ﬁve years. Despite these diﬀerences, we do
not identify diﬀerential reform eﬀects by parity. While there are some group diﬀerentials in
point estimates, none of these diﬀerences are signiﬁcant at the 10 per cent level.
6 Robustness checks
In addition to inclusion of exogenous covariates, we have conducted four robustness checks. We
start by varying the inclusion criteria for our two study samples, ﬁrst around the cutoﬀ (donut
tests) (Section 6.1), and then narrowing and widening the birth months included (Section 6.2).
We then test if the reform signiﬁcantly aﬀects pre-reform outcomes (Section 6.3). Finally, we
perform a complete placebo reform (Section 6.4)
6.1 Donut tests: Varying exclusion around the cutoﬀ
As discussed above, estimates may be biased because women strategically time delivery de-
pending on their preferences for parental leave. To test whether such strategic timing inﬂuenes
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our results, we estimate donut plots showing point estimates for a total of 26 regressions per
outcome, excluding one day at the time at each side of the cutoﬀ. Ideally, the estimates we
have presented above should be robust to further exclusion around the cutoﬀ. As the sample
size falls with increased exclusion (Figures A.3g and A.4f), so will precision, meaning that our
focus is on comparing point estimates.
Figure A.3 shows donut tests for the parental leave variables. We see that characteristics of
father's leave uptake, measured both in days (Figure A.3a), length of mean spell (Figure A.3c)
and the proportion who takes at least 10 weeks of leave (Figure A.3e), are relatively stable
across diﬀerent exclusions around the cutoﬀ. This supports that these estimates are not driven
by random variation or timing. There is a tendency of larger point estimates for father's leave
uptake without any exclusion around the cutoﬀ, indicating that some couples may strategically
time birth after the reform date due to a preference for a longer parental leave.
Estimates for mother's leave uptake are somewhat more sensitive to the window of exclusion.
With no exclusion around the cutoﬀ, estimates for mothers' total leave days (Figure A.3b) and
mean length of spell (Figure A.3d) are positive and close to zero. When ﬁve days or more are
excluded around the cutoﬀ, estimates turn negative, yet they decrease in magnitude and loose
signiﬁcance when 15 or more days are excluded. Similarly, the eﬀect on 80 per cent compensation
(Figure A.3f) seems to depend strongly on the window of exclusion, and we can hence not rule
out that this ﬁnding is due to a statistical ﬂuke in our main sample.
Figure A.4 shows the results of donut tests for ﬁve sociodemographic outcomes measured
when the focal child is ﬁve years old  union dissolution, having a younger sibling, and mother's
and father's log earnings, as well as mother's share of family earnings. None of these outcomes
were signiﬁcantly aﬀected by the reform in our main speciﬁcation, and the donut plots show
that this ﬁnding is robust across diﬀerent exclusion rules.
In sum, our donut tests indicate that the eﬀects on father's leave uptake are robust, while the
magnitude of eﬀects on her leave uptake and total leave length are more sensitive to speciﬁcation.
We note that eﬀects on her leave length are consistently negative, so that the direction of the
eﬀect is robust. The null ﬁndings on sociodemographic outcomes are robust to varying exclusion
around the cutoﬀ.
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6.2 Varying the width of the observation window
To further ascertain that trends in the running variable does not bias our results, we run our
main models on both restricted samples (focal children born in June and July 2009) and extended
samples (focal children born March to October 2009). We continue to exclude focal children
born in the 13 days on each side of the cutoﬀ, as in our main speciﬁcation. Analysis of parental
leave outcomes on the restricted sample (Appendix Table A.3) yields point estimates that are
very similar to those found in the main sample for father's leave length (Table 3), yet the lower
sample size reduces precision. For mother's leave length, estimates in the restricted sample are
somewhat more negative than in the main sample.
When the inclusion window is extended (Appendix Table A.4), eﬀects on father's leave length
and uptake remain closely similar to those found in the main sample. For both total length of
leave (80% compensation) and mother's leave length, estimates are attenuated when the window
is extended. The gradual weakening of the eﬀects for mothers with the extension of the sample
window corroborates the impression of sensitivity from the donut test of these variables (Section
6.1). Yet, the ﬁnding of a negative eﬀect on mother's leave length remains robust.
6.3 Eﬀects on pre-reform outcomes
Our third robustness test pertains to estimating eﬀects on pre-reform outcomes. As the parental
leave sample is (potentially) endogenously conditioned, while the sociodemographic sample is
not (see Section 4 for more details), tests are performed separately for the two samples. We
show t-tests of mean diﬀerences (Table 7), discontinuity plots (Appendix Figures A.5 and A.6
for the parental leave and sociodemographic samples respectively) and regression discontinuity
estimates (Table 8).
In the simple mean tests (Table 7), we test eﬀects on a range of sociodemographic charac-
teristics measured pre-reform (2008), including three market work outcomes (his and her log
earnings, her share of couple earnings), parity of the focal child, measures of educational attain-
ment and student status, the couple's propensity to be married. Two statistically signiﬁcant
diﬀerences emerge in both samples: Treated fathers earn on average less than untreated fathers,
and treated mothers are 1 percentage point more likely to be enrolled in education than are
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untreated mothers.
In general, the discontinuity plots (Appendix Figures A.5 and A.6 for parental leave and
sociodemographic samples respectively) show no clear visual discontinuites; the diﬀerences with
respect to father's earnings and mother's student status are small yet discernible. When the
running variable and exogenous controls are included in a RD model (Table 8), the eﬀect on
mother's student status is rendered insigniﬁcant, while the eﬀect on fathers' earnings is sig-
niﬁcant at the ten per cent level only. No additional signiﬁcant diﬀerences emerge in the RD
pre-outcome models (Table 8). With the number of tests we perform, ﬁnding one signiﬁcant
diﬀerence at the ten per cent level is no more that one should expect from chance, and over-
all we consider the samples to be balanced. We note that the parental leave sample, that is
in theory endogenously conditioned, does not fare worse in the balancing tests than does the
sociodemographic sample.
6.4 Placebo reform
Our most important robustness test is the implementation of a placebo reform July 1 2008.
The construction of the placebo reform sample mirror the construction of the main sample
exactly, with all criteria and measurements shifted one year back (see Section 4.2). Descriptive
statistics for the placebo test sample is shown in Appendix Table A.7. For parental leave
outcomes (Panel A), we see that diﬀerences by placebo reform status are generally small and
statistically insigniﬁcant. The exception is that treated couples are ﬁve precentage points less
likely to take a longer leave, probably reﬂecting that children born later in the year tend to be
oﬀered a child care slot at a slightly younger age. For sociodemographic outcomes (Panel B),
the mean diﬀerences indicate that the treated children are two percentage points less likely to
have at least one younger sibling at age two, a diﬀerence that persists at age ﬁve.
We inspect discontinuity plots for the placebo reform (Appendix Figures A.7 and A.8 for
parental leave and socioeconomic outcomes respectively), emphasising outcomes for which mean
diﬀerences were found. For younger siblings (Appendix Figure A.8b), there is hardly any dis-
cernible visual discontinuity, while the plot for taking a overall shorter leave (Appendix Figure
A.7f) reveals a clear discontinuity at the cutoﬀ, although overlapping conﬁdence intervals of
binned data indicate that it may not be statistically signiﬁcant. For other outcomes, there is
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little evidence of (potentially signiﬁcant) discontinuities.
Turning to the RD estimates for the placebo analysis (Appendix Table A.8),the point esti-
mates for father's leave days and father's propensity to take more than 50 days of leave are close
to zero and statistically insigniﬁcant. Point estimates for mothers indicate that the treated
mothers take 13-19 days less leave than the untreated, yet this diﬀerence is rended insigniﬁ-
cant after controls.13 We identify a negative placebo eﬀect (p<0.1) on the propensity to take
part time leave, indicating some discontinous seasonality in this outcome only. Donut tests
on parental leave estimates from the placebo sample (Appendix Figure A.9) conﬁrm that the
estimates from this sample are consistently statistically insigniﬁcant. Turning to eﬀects on so-
ciodemographic outcomes, placebo reform eﬀects are small, zero to the ﬁrst decimal or negative,
and never statistically signiﬁcant.
Balance tests on pre-reform variables (Table A.9) indicates that treatment and control
are largely balanced before the running variable is netted out. In contrast to the main sample,
treatment fathers now earn more than control fathers, yet the diﬀerence is smaller and no
longer statistically signiﬁcant. As in the main sample, there is signiﬁcant imbalance on the
proportion of student mothers, with 1 percentage point more students in the treated group.
This indicates that the seasonality of fertility patterns may diﬀer consistently for mothers who
are enrolled in education and mothers who are not. As for the in the main sample, no diﬀerences
are signiﬁcant at the ﬁve per cent level when date and exogenous controls are included in a RD
design (results available upon request).
6.5 Summary of robustness tests
In sum, the placebo test corroborates that eﬀects on father's leave uptake, as well as the absence
of eﬀect of sociodemographic outcomes, are not an artefact of seasonality not captured by the
running variable. This strengthens our interpretation that our main model correctly identiﬁes
eﬀects on father's leave taking behavior, and that these changes do not translate into changes in
the division of paid work, union stability and/or fertility. This impression is further corroborated
by the same estimates being robust to variation in the sample window (both around the cutoﬀ
and at the outer margin). Simple t-tests show that the sample is largely balanced with respect
to observable pre-reform characteristics, and imbalances do not exceed what one should expect
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from chance when the running variable is netted out in an RD. This further strengthens the
causal interpretation of our results.
7 Concluding discussion
Increased father involvement has been suggested as a pathway to stabilize parental unions and
increase fertility. Changes in policies intended to aﬀect father involvement, such as paternity
quotas in parental leave, may serve as a test of eﬀects of father involvement on union stability
and fertility. We add to the literature by analyzing an expansion of the paternity quota in 2009
in Norway. Before the introduction, the majority of fathers already took some parental leave,
and likely due to an extensive supply of public child care slots from age one, long maternal
career breaks upon the birth of a(nother) child had become rare (Rønsen and Kitterød, 2015).
Extending paternity quotas in this context may have potential to aﬀect patterns of work and
care in families, and in turn shaping family dynamics. In contrast, at introduction, paternity
qoutas tend to aﬀect only a minority, and strong norms of care for small children as the mothers'
work may prevail.
Our study utilizes the extension of the Norwegian paternity quota from 6 to 10 weeks as a
source of exogenous variation in the length of paternity leave. We study reform eﬀects on leave
uptake, earnings, union stability and fertility in a Regression Discontinuity design, restricting
our study sample to children born in the weeks around the implementation of the reform. The
reform generated substantial and signiﬁcant eﬀects on leave uptake, inducing fathers who would
have taken some leave regardless of the policy change to extend their leave with about 14 work
days on average. The percent of fathers who takes at least 10 weeks of leave (the extended
quota) increased with 50 percentage points from a baseline of 12 per cent. Mothers reduced
their leave by about one month (21 work days) on average, but the exact length of this reduction
is sensitive to speciﬁcation. In terms of changing the division of labor in a child's ﬁrst year of
life, and providing an opportunity to strengthen the bond between father and child, the reform
was a success. A battery of robustness checks supports that the variation in father involvement
is truly exogenous, i.e. not driven by self-selection or seasonal variations in leave uptake.
Our results do not show eﬀects on union dissolution when the focal child is ﬁve years old.
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Hence, neither the expectation that increased father involvement would increase relationship
satisifaction and stabilize unions (Goldscheider et al., 2015) nor that it would disrupt special-
ization and reduce union stability (Becker, 1991) were supported. We also test whether the
reform shifts the timing of union dissolution by estimating eﬀects when the focal child is aged
one through four years, again ﬁnding no eﬀects.
While union dissolution is not moved in a way we can measure, it is important to acknowledge
that the reform may have caused incremental changes in relationship quality, not discernable
with our data. To the best of our knowledge, no Norwegian data source combines the statistical
strength required for an RD with self-reported data on relevant aspects of life in families 
such as division of unpaid labor and relationship quality. A survey of such aspects, strategically
administered to couples who had a child around the reform cutoﬀ, would be invaluable to reform
evaluation.
Parity progression is also unmoved by the reform, both in the medium term (ﬁve years), and
in the short term (one through four years). Quicker parity progression may be an indicator of
union quality, potentially easier to move than union stability itself. However, even if the reform
did improve union quality, eﬀects on parity progression may be depressed by the potentially
larger opportunity cost of childbearing for fathers constituted by a longer paternity quota.
There are no signiﬁcant subsample diﬀerences when splitting by his and her education, parity,
child sex, and parental age.
How do we interpret the lack of eﬀects of paternity quotas on family dynamics? As a ﬁrst
step to understand mechanisms, we have estimated reform eﬀects on division of paid work in
the family, using this as a measure of changes in gender equality in the couples. Being exposed
to a longer paternity quota may entail a learning eﬀect, making fathers eﬃcient in and aware
of household chores, and leading them to take on more unpaid work also when the parental
leave has come to an end. In short, we ﬁnd no lasting eﬀect on neither his or her earnings,
neither on the intensive (log earnings) or extensive (probability of employment) margin. In
the short run, we ﬁnd a negative eﬀect on her log earnings when the focal child turns two,
presumably driven by an increase in unpaid leave as a response to a shorter total leave. Her
share of couple earnings is consistently unmoved, in the short and long run. To the extent that
changes in family dynamics were to be driven solely by changes in the division of paid work,
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it is unsurprising that the reform yielded no eﬀects. Our results are in line by those obtained
by Østbakken et al. (2018), published in a report with limited peer review, and with the eﬀects
of the introduction of the Norwegian paternity quota as analyzed by Cools et al. (2015). Our
results indicate that even in a context where take-up is high, paternity quota does not move
the earnings of women nor men. As such, our ﬁndings provide a contrast to those of Rege and
Solli (2013). We note that division of unpaid labor may change in ways that leave paid work
unaﬀected. In a Norwegian qualitative study, fathers who took long paternity leave report that
their attachment with the child and their practical involvement were strengthened, though their
work practices were mainly unaﬀected by this (Østbakken et al., 2018). Such changes could
have implication for family stability and parity progression.
There is extensive scholarly debate on the link between father involvement on one side and
fertility and union stability on the other. The dominant perspective that non-traditional families
would give more union dissolutions and lower fertility (Becker, 1991) has been challenged by
contributions suggesting the opposite eﬀect (Cooke, 2006; Esping-Andersen and Billari, 2015;
Goldscheider et al., 2015; Sigle-Rushton, 2010). The idea that father involvement strengthens
families is intuitively appealing: it reconciles ideals of gender equality with ideals of stability
of parous unions and relatively high fertility, indicating that more, not less, gender equality is
the receipt for more children being raised in intact families. While far from a perfect test, our
results cast some doubt on on the claim that father involvement  at least as induced by changes
in parental leave policies  stabilizes unions and increases fertility. Of course, several aspects
of father involvement are unmoved by this reform, and it is possible that gradual changes in
fathering practices remain causally related to both union stability and subsequent childbearing.
Still, as long as evidence for this hypothesis remains limited to estimates with potentially strong
selection bias, one might also ponder if more gender equality simply is not as eﬀective a
pathway to more stable parental unions and higher fertility as hypothesized.
On a more positive note, our results are reassuring for policy makers who contemplate exten-
sions of paternity quota, but are concerned that this may introduce or intensify fatherhood wage
penalties. We ﬁnd no evidence that fathers moved by the reform to extend their parental leave
experienced such penalties. Of course, some fathers may have anticipated earnings penalties,
and taken shorter or no leave despite the reform. Still, at least in the relatively family friendly
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Norwegian environment, fathers who make use of extended paternity quotas to bond with their
young children are neither putting their career prospects nor the family income at risk.
Notes
1The Nordic parental leave system oﬀers parents a generous wage-compensation for staying home with a
newborn child for around one year, and while the bulk of parental leave can be shared freely between the
parents, it is in practice taken up mainly by the mother (Duvander and Lammi-Taskula, 2011; Lappegård, 2008).
2Because both mothers and fathers can shift time between paid/unpaid work and (pure) leisure, his increased
eﬀort at home may, but need not, be reﬂected in his lower earnings and/or her higher earnings.
3A negative eﬀect on his earnings can also emerge from signaling; that is, that fathers who are induced by
the reform to take longer leave faces subsequent discrimination (wage penalties).
4The father's quota could not be transferred to the mother unless she was a single parent, the father was
ineligible to paid parental leave, or the father was too sick or otherwise unable to care for the child.
5The base rate (G) of the Norwegian Social Insurance scheme is an annually adjusted amount used to deﬁne
beneﬁt eligibility and calculate pensions. As of 1. July 2009, the BA was 72 881 NOK, or 11 602 USD (calculated
based on the exchange rated for 2009, https://www.norges-bank.no/en/Statistics/exchange_rates/currency/
USD).
6It should be noted the public debate regarding the reform picked up in Norwegian newspapers as early as
October 2008 (i.e. nine months prior to the implementation), but that it remains unlikely that future parents
were able to guess the implementation date, as previous family policy reforms had been implemented on both
April 1, May 1 and July 1.
7To avoid that the local polynomial regression adapts to the missing data around the cutoﬀ, we add 13 to the
running variable for all births before the cutoﬀ, and subtract 13 to all births after the cutoﬀ.
8Some parents are registered with a higher number of leave days than the parental leave system allows,
potentially due to the erroneous registration of, e.g., sick leave days etc. during the paid parental leave period.
Hence, we cap the leave duration at the maximum number of leave days available. The results are not sensitive
to this.
9Tidskonto (time account) allows parents to take leave days part time, for instance may the mother
stay at home with the child certain days of the week, and the father stay at home the remaining days, see
https://www.nav.no/ﬂeksibeltuttak.
10Couples without earnings have equal earnings, and are assigned a value of 0.5.
11A donut test (available upon request) reveal that the very large negative point estimate for mother's leave
length when the focal child is a boy is strongly sensitive to exclusion around the cutoﬀ.
12Norwegian employees are entitled to a period of unpaid leave directly following parental leave to care for
small children.
13To the extent that child care availability heaps around August in Norway, a shorter better paid leave in
combination with holiday for each parent should be suﬃcient to cover care for a child born 1 week before August
1st (or later). 46 weeks of leave at 80 per cent compensation, minus 3 weeks mandatory for the mother before
birth (assuming birth on due date), plus 10 weeks of paid holiday gives 53 weeks. Given our exclusion of four
weeks around the cutoﬀ, this corresponds closely to 100 percent compensation being more attractive to the
treated in the main sample, and the treated in the placebo sample.
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Tables and Figures
Table 1: Development in the paid parental leave scheme, with 80/100 percent income coverage.
Number of weeks.
Eﬀective date Reserved mother Reserved father To be shared Total number of weeks
April 1 1992 9 - 24/33 33/42
April 1 1993 9 4 29/39 42/52
July 1 2005 9 5 29/39 43/53
July 1 2006 9 6 29/39 44/54
July 1 2009 9 10 27/37 46/56
Note: Of the weeks reserved for the mother, three weeks are to be used prior to giving birth, and an additional
six immediately after. The father cannot take any of his leave days during this period. However, fathers may
take 2 weeks of unpaid care leave during the ﬁrst two weeks of the child's life. Several employers, including the
Norwegian public sector, will allow the father to take paid leave these two weeks. This is unrelated to the father's
quota.
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Table 2: Mean diﬀerences by treatment status. Outcome variables. Parental leave sample (Panel
A) and sociodemographic sample (Panel B)
Panel A: Parental leave outcomes
Post Pre Post - Pre
Father's days of leave (org.) 47.37 33.12 14.25∗∗∗
Father's days of leave 47.05 33.09 13.95∗∗∗
Father takes leave 0.78 0.77 0.01
Father takes >=10 weeks 0.63 0.12 0.51∗∗∗
Father N leave spells 1.17 1.04 0.12∗∗∗
Father mean duration spell 40.27 28.86 11.41∗∗∗
Father uses time account 0.10 0.08 0.02∗∗
Father 80% compensation 0.45 0.55 -0.10∗∗∗
Mother's days of leave (org.) 208.62 227.86 -19.24∗∗∗
Mother's days of leave 201.93 217.58 -15.64∗∗∗
Mother takes leave 0.88 0.89 -0.01
Mother N leave spells 0.93 0.95 -0.01
Mother mean duration spell 202.87 221.31 -18.44∗∗∗
Mother uses time account 0.02 0.01 0.00
Observations 9516
Panel B: Sociodemographic outcomes
Post Pre Post - Pre
Mother's share 2y 0.39 0.39 -0.00
Mother's share 5y 0.40 0.39 0.01
Union intact 2y 0.98 0.98 0.00
Union intact 5y 0.89 0.90 -0.01
Father working 2y 0.95 0.96 -0.00
Father working 5y 0.95 0.95 -0.00
Father ln(earn) 2y 12.79 12.81 -0.02
Father ln(earn) 5y 12.84 12.87 -0.03
Mother working 2y 0.90 0.91 -0.01
Mother working 5y 0.91 0.91 -0.00
Mother ln(earn) 2y 12.02 12.10 -0.08
Mother ln(earn) 5y 12.20 12.21 -0.01
N younger sibs 2y 0.08 0.07 0.01
N younger sibs 5y 0.38 0.37 0.01
Has younger sib 2y 0.08 0.07 0.01
Has younger sib 5y 0.35 0.34 0.01
Observations 9757
Note: The samples are opposite-sex couples with children born in 2009, either between May 1-June 17 (control)
or July 14-August 31 (treatment). Couples must have co-resided as of January 1 2008, and the mother must be
registered with earned income in 2008. In the parental leave sample, siblings (if any) must be born at least 16
months before/after the focal child.∗∗∗ p<0.001, ∗∗ p<0.01, ∗ p<0.05, † p<0.1.
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Table 3: Reform eﬀects on leave uptake and outcomes. Main samples. OLS/LPM estimates
from Regression Discontinuity models.
No controls Controls
Est (SE) Est (SE)
A: LEAVE UPTAKE FATHERS
Number of days 14,13 (3,58) *** 14,41 (3,69) ***
Use time account 0,00 (0,03) 0,00 (0,03)
Takes leave -0,02 (0,05) -0,01 (0,04)
Takes >= 50 days leave 0,49 (0,05) *** 0,50 (0,05) ***
Mean duration of spell 11,46 (3,29) *** 11,64 (3,40) **
Number of spells -0,09 (0,18) -0,08 (0,17)
80% compensation -0,16 (0,06) ** -0,15 (0,06) **
B: LEAVE UPTAKE MOTHERS
Number of days -21,50 (8,61) ** -20,82 (8,35) **
Use time account -0,02 (0,01) † -0,02 (0,01) †
Takes leave -0,02 (0,03) -0,02 (0,03)
Mean duration of spell -23,38 (9,39) ** -22,85 (9,22) **
Number of spells -0,03 (0,04) -0,03 (0,04)
C: DEMOGRAPHIC OUTCOMES
Intact union ch. 5 y -0,04 (0,03) -0,03 (0,03)
At least one younger sibling 5 y -0,03 (0,05) -0,04 (0,05)
N younger siblings 5 y -0,03 (0,06) -0,04 (0,05)
D: EARNINGS OUTCOMES
Mothers' share ch. 5 y 0,03 (0,02) 0,03 (0,02)
Father working ch. 5 y -0,03 (0,03) -0,03 (0,02)
Father ln(earn.) ch. 5 y -0,36 (0,30) -0,30 (0,27)
Mother working ch. 5 y -0,01 (0,03) 0,00 (0,03)
Mother ln(earn.) ch. 5 y -0,10 (0,25) -0,09 (0,29)
Note: N=9 516 for the parental leave sample and 9 757 for the sociodemographic sample. The samples are
opposite-sex couples with children born in 2009, either between May 1-June 17 (control) or July 14-August 31
(treatment). Couples must have co-resided as of January 1 2008, and the mother must be registered with earned
income in 2008. In the parental leave sample, siblings (if any) must be born at least 16 months before/after the
focal child. *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, † p<0.1.
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Table 4: Reform eﬀects on leave uptake. Subsample estimates. OLS/LPM estimates from
Regression Discontinuity models.
NO CONTROLS FULL CONTROLS
Est. (S.E.) Est. (S.E.) N
Father's leave days
By child sex
Girl 10,29 (5,69) † 6,92 (5,85) 4888
Boy 16,49 (4,98) ** 19,56 (4,80) *** 4628
By (mother's) parity
First born 14,40 (6,57) * 14,06 (6,62) † 2603
Second born 12,22 (5,22) * 13,44 (5,33) * 4499
Higher order 15,24 (6,74) * 17,90 (6,29) ** 2414
By union type in 2008
Cohabiting 12,97 (5,12) * 13,24 (5,00) * 5014
Married 14,51 (5,61) ** 17,57 (5,60) ** 4502
By father's education
No higher education 10,56 (4,66) * 9,73 (4,92) † 4871
Higher education 18,25 (4,76) *** 17,74 (4,59) *** 4483
By mother's education
No higher education 10,54 (5,85) † 10,39 (5,98) 3635
Higher education 17,61 (4,27) *** 17,93 (4,26) *** 5674
By parent's age
Not young parents 14,32 (3,56) ** 15,03 (3,73) *** 1480
Young parents 12,89 (9,94) 14,41 (9,38) 8036
Mother's leave days
By child sex
Girl -10,47 (13,11) -10,67 (13,23) 4628
Boy -44,61 (16,62) ** -45,87 (16,62) ** 4888
By (mother's) parity
First born -41,30 (20,56) * -40,28 (20,49) * 2603
Second born -14,80 (13,74) -14,68 (13,55) 4499
Higher order -24,93 (22,17) -17,82 (19,53) 2414
By union type in 2008
Cohabiting -22,89 (11,28) * -27,43 (11,84) ** 5014
Married -19,02 (14,06) -12,93 (13,62) 4502
By father's education
No higher education -29,79 (15,37) * -31,51 (15,81) * 4871
Higher education -13,47 (13,44) -7,44 (13,41) 4483
By mother's education
No higher education -25,25 (18,62) -27,39 (18,72) 3635
Higher education -20,97 (10,44) * -19,09 (10,11) * 5674
By parent's age
Not young parents -28,53 (9,65) ** -26,18 (8,61) *** 1480
Young parents 12,50 (20,53) 9,29 (24,57) 8036
Note: For splits by union type and parity, subsamples sum to N=9 516. Splits by education sum to a lower N
due to exclusion of individuals with missing educational attainment. The sample is opposite-sex couples with
children born in 2009, either between May 1-June 17 (control) or July 14-August 31 (treatment). Couples must
have co-resided as of January 1 2008, and the mother must be registered with earned income in 2008, and siblings
(if any) must be born at least 16 months before/after the focal child. *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, † p<0.1.
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Table 5: Reform eﬀects on her share of earnings. Subsample estimates. OLS/LPM estimates
from Regression Discontinuity models.
NO CONTROLS FULL CONTROLS
Est. (S.E.) Est. (S.E.) N
By child sex
Girl 0,04 (0,03) 0,03 (0,03) 4747
Boy 0,01 (0,03) 0,02 (0,03) 5010
By (mother's) parity
First born -0,01 (0,03) -0,01 (0,04) 2647
Second born 0,01 (0,03) 0,01 (0,03) 4629
Higher order 0,11 (0,05) * 0,08 (0,05) † 2481
By union type in 2008
Cohabiting 0,02 (0,02) 0,02 (0,02) 5136
Married 0,03 (0,04) 0,03 (0,04) 4621
By father's education
No higher education 0,03 (0,03) 0,03 (0,03) 5006
Higher education 0,02 (0,03) 0,02 (0,03) 4580
By mother's education
No higher education 0,01 (0,04) 0,02 (0,04) 3755
Higher education 0,03 (0,03) 0,04 (0,02) † 5788
By parent's age
Not young parents 0,03 (0,02) 0,03 (0,02) † 8227
Young parents -0,01 (0,05) 0,01 (0,05) 1530
Note: For splits by union type, parity, child sex and parent's age, subsamples sum to N=9 757. Splits by
education sum to a lower N due to exclusion of individuals with missing educational attainment. The sample is
opposite-sex couples with children born in 2009, either between May 1-June 17 (control) or July 14-August 31
(treatment). Couples must have co-resided as of January 1 2008, and the mother must be registered with earned
income in 2008. *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, † p<0.1.
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Table 6: Reform eﬀects demographic outcomes. Subsample estimates. OLS/LPM estimates
from Regression Discontinuity models.
NO CONTROLS FULL CONTROLS
Est. (S.E.) Est. (S.E.) N
Probability of intact union
By child sex
Girl -0,02 (0,05) -0,03 (0,05) 4747
Boy -0,06 (0,04) -0,04 (0,04) 5010
By (mother's) parity
First born -0,07 (0,06) -0,07 (0,06) 2647
Second born -0,03 (0,05) -0,02 (0,05) 4629
Higher order -0,04 (0,06) -0,03 (0,05) 2481
By union type in 2008
Cohabiting -0,07 (0,05) † -0,08 (0,05) * 5136
Married 0,00 (0,04) 0,01 (0,04) 4621
By father's education
No higher education -0,03 (0,05) -0,04 (0,05) 5006
Higher education -0,04 (0,04) -0,02 (0,04) 4580
By mother's education
No higher education -0,07 (0,06) -0,07 (0,06) 3755
Higher education -0,02 (0,04) -0,02 (0,04) 5788
By parent's age
Not young parents -0,03 (0,04) -0,02 (0,03) 8227
Young parents -0,09 (0,08) -0,09 (0,07) 1530
Subsequent sibling
By child sex
Girl -0,01 (0,08) -0,05 (0,07) 4747
Boy -0,05 (0,07) -0,04 (0,07) 5010
By (mother's) parity
First born -0,09 (0,09) -0,08 (0,07) 2647
Second born -0,04 (0,07) -0,06 (0,07) 4629
Higher order 0,01 (0,07) 0,02 (0,07) 2481
By union type in 2008
Cohabiting -0,03 (0,06) -0,06 (0,06) 5136
Married -0,01 (0,08) -0,03 (0,07) 4621
By father's education
No higher education -0,09 (0,07) -0,08 (0,07) 5006
Higher education 0,06 (0,08) 0,00 (0,06) 4580
By mother's education
No higher education -0,01 (0,07) -0,01 (0,07) 3755
Higher education -0,03 (0,07) -0,08 (0,06) 5788
By parent's age
Not young parents 0,00 (0,05) -0,02 (0,05) 8227
Young parents -0,13 (0,14) -0,10 (0,12) 1530
Note: For splits by union type, parity, child sex and parent's age, subsamples sum to N=9 757. Splits by
education sum to a lower N due to exclusion of individuals with missing educational attainment. The sample is
opposite-sex couples with children born in 2009, either between May 1-June 17 (control) or July 14-August 31
(treatment). Couples must have co-resided as of January 1 2008, and the mother must be registered with earned
income in 2008. *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, † p<0.1.
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Table 7: Mean diﬀerences by treatment status. Balancing tests on pre-reform characteristics.
Parental leave sample (Panel A) and sociodemographic sample (Panel B)
Panel A: Parental leave sample Post Pre Post - pre
Married 0.48 0.47 0.00
Parity 2.05 2.05 0.00
Mother's age 31.52 31.55 -0.03
Mother's earnings 311570.39 313522.27 -1951.87
Mother's share earnings 0.41 0.41 0.01
Mother basic educ. 0.12 0.11 0.00
Mother HS educ. 0.27 0.28 -0.01
Mother higher educ., lower degr. 0.44 0.44 0.00
Mother higher educ., higher degr. 0.15 0.14 0.01
Mother missing educ. 0.02 0.02 -0.00
Mother student 0.10 0.09 0.01∗
Father's age 34.35 34.23 0.12
Father's earnings 472392.17 489399.85 -17007.69∗
Father basic educ. 0.17 0.15 0.01
Father HS educ. 0.39 0.41 -0.01
Father higher educ., lower degr. 0.28 0.27 0.01
Father higher educ., higher degr. 0.14 0.16 -0.01
Father missing educ. 0.02 0.02 0.00
Father student 0.07 0.06 0.01
Observations 9516
Panel B: Sociodemographic sample Post Pre Post - pre
Married 0.48 0.47 0.01
Parity 2.05 2.05 -0.00
Mother's share earnings 0.41 0.40 0.01
Mother's age 31.48 31.53 -0.05
Mother employed 0.95 0.95 -0.00
Mother's earnings 310798.04 312530.61 -1732.57
Mother basic educ. 0.12 0.11 0.00
Mother HS educ. 0.27 0.29 -0.01
Mother higher educ., lower degr. 0.44 0.44 -0.00
Mother higher educ., higher degr. 0.14 0.14 0.01
Mother missing educ. 0.02 0.02 0.00
Mother student 0.10 0.09 0.01∗
Father's age 34.33 34.21 0.11
Father employed 0.96 0.97 -0.01∗∗
Father's earnings 472245.40 488204.97 -15959.57∗
Father basic educ. 0.17 0.16 0.01
Father HS educ. 0.39 0.41 -0.01
Father higher educ., lower degr. 0.28 0.27 0.01
Father higher educ., higher degr. 0.14 0.16 -0.01
Father missing educ. 0.02 0.02 0.00
Father student 0.07 0.06 0.01
Observations 9757
Note: The samples are opposite-sex couples with children born in 2009, either between May 1-June 17 (control)
or July 14-August 31 (treatment). Couples must have co-resided as of January 1 2008, and the mother must be
registered with earned income in 2008. In the parental leave sample, siblings (if any) must be born at least 16
months before/after the focal child.∗∗∗ p<0.001, ∗∗ p<0.01, ∗ p<0.05, † p<0.1.
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Table 8: Robustness check: Reform eﬀects on pre-reform outcomes. Main samples. OLS/LPM
estimates from Regression Discontinuity models.
No controls Controls
Est (SE) Est (SE)
Panel A: Parental leave sample
Married -0,03 (0,05) -0,03 (0,05)
Parity -0,09 (0,11) -0,07 (0,11)
Mother
Share couple earnings -0,01 (0,02) 0,00 (0,02)
Earnings -16062,52 (18027,72) -7470,06 (16648,11)
Is working 0,00 (0,02) 0,00 (0,02)
Basic educ. 0,00 (0,04) -0,01 (0,04)
HS educ. 0,01 (0,05) 0,00 (0,04)
Higher educ., lower 0,00 (0,05) 0,00 (0,05)
Higher educ., upper -0,02 (0,04) -0,01 (0,04)
Missing educ. 0,02 (0,02) 0,02 (0,02)
Enrolled in educ -0,02 (0,03) -0,02 (0,03)
Father
Earnings -38985,45 (25930,93) -42617,76 (25407,58) †
Is working -0,02 (0,02) -0,02 (0,02)
Basic educ. -0,01 (0,04) -0,02 (0,04)
HS educ. 0,04 (0,05) 0,04 (0,05)
Higher educ., lower -0,02 (0,05) -0,02 (0,05)
Higher educ., upper -0,01 (0,03) -0,01 (0,03)
Missing educ. 0,01 (0,01) 0,01 (0,01)
Enrolled in educ -0,03 (0,03) -0,02 (0,03)
Panel B: Socioeconomic sample
Married -0,02 (0,05) -0,02 (0,05)
Parity -0,10 (0,11) -0,07 (0,10)
Mother
Share couple earnings -0,01 (0,02) 0,00 (0,02)
Earnings -17425,41 (18387,09) -8524,97 (16934,34)
Is working -0,01 (0,02) 0,00 (0,02)
Basic educ. 0,00 (0,04) 0,00 (0,04)
HS educ. 0,00 (0,05) -0,01 (0,04)
Higher educ., lower 0,00 (0,05) 0,00 (0,05)
Higher educ., upper -0,02 (0,04) 0,00 (0,03)
Missing educ. 0,02 (0,02) 0,01 (0,02)
Enrolled in educ -0,02 (0,03) -0,02 (0,03)
Father
Earnings -41350,39 (25702,54) † -44909,28 (24972,80) †
Is working -0,02 (0,02) -0,02 (0,02)
Basic educ. -0,01 (0,04) -0,01 (0,04)
HS educ. 0,04 (0,05) 0,03 (0,05)
Higher educ., lower -0,02 (0,04) -0,01 (0,05)
Higher educ., upper -0,01 (0,03) -0,01 (0,03)
Missing educ. 0,01 (0,01) 0,01 (0,01)
Enrolled in educ -0,02 (0,03) -0,02 (0,03)
Note: N=9 516 for the parental leave sample and 9 757 for the sociodemographic sample. The samples are
opposite-sex couples with children born in 2009, either between May 1-June 17 (control) or July 14-August 31
(treatment). Couples must have co-resided as of January 1 2008, and the mother must be registered with earned
income in 2008. In the parental leave sample, siblings (if any) must be born at least 16 months before/after the
focal child. *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, † p<0.1.42
Figure 1: Reform eﬀects on leave uptake measures. Discontinuity plots. Lines give linear ﬁt
on each side of the cutoﬀ. Points give bin-speciﬁc means, error bars give their 95 per cent
conﬁdence intervals.
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Note: N=9 516. The sample is opposite-sex couples with children born in 2009, either between May 1-June 17
(control) or July 14-August 31 (treatment). Couples must have co-resided as of January 1 2008, and the mother
must be registered with earned income in 2008, and siblings (if any) must be born at least 16 months before/after
the focal child.
43
Figure 2: Reform eﬀects on sociodemographic outcomes. Discontinuity plots. Lines give linear
ﬁt on each side of the cutoﬀ. Points give bin-speciﬁc means, error bars give their 95 per cent
conﬁdence intervals. .
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Note: N=9 757. The sample is opposite-sex couples with children born in 2009, either between May 1-June 17
(control) or July 14-August 31 (treatment). Couples must have co-resided as of January 1 2008, and the mother
must be registered with earned income in 2008.
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Figure 3: Reform eﬀects on sociodemographic outcomes. OLS/LPM estimates from Regression
Discontinuity models, estimated separately by the age of the focal child. Dots mark point
estimates and error bars 95 per cent conﬁdence intervals. Black lines indicates basic model,
grey full controls.
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Note: N=9 757. The sample is opposite-sex couples with children born in 2009, either between May 1-June 17
(control) or July 14-August 31 (treatment). Couples must have co-resided as of January 1 2008, and the mother
must be registered with earned income in 2008.
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Appendix I: Additional tables and ﬁgures
Figure A.1: Timing eﬀects by subgroup on parity progression. Dots give OLS/LPM estimates
from Regression Discontinuity models and error bars their 95 per cent conﬁdence intervals.
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Note: N=9 757. The sample is opposite-sex couples with children born in 2009, either between May 1-June 17
(control) or July 14-August 31 (treatment). Couples must have co-resided as of January 1 2008, and the mother
must be registered with earned income in 2008.
Figure A.2: Timing eﬀects by subgroup on union dissolution. Dots give OLS/LPM estimates
from Regression Discontinuity models and error bars their 95 per cent conﬁdence intervals.
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Note: N=9 757. The sample is opposite-sex couples with children born in 2009, either between May 1-June 17
(control) or July 14-August 31 (treatment). Couples must have co-resided as of January 1 2008, and the mother
must be registered with earned income in 2008.
Figure A.3: Donut plots for uptake, main sample. Dots give OLS/LPM estimates from Regres-
sion Discontinuity models and error bars their 95 per cent conﬁdence intervals.
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Note: The sample is opposite-sex couples with children born in 2009, either between May 1-June 17 (control)
or July 14-August 31 (treatment). Couples must have co-resided as of January 1 2008, and the mother must be
registered with earned income in 2008, and siblings (if any) must be born at least 16 months before/after the
focal child.
Figure A.4: Donut plots for sociodemographic outcomes, main sample. Dots give OLS/LPM
estimates from Regression Discontinuity models and error bars their 95 per cent conﬁdence
intervals.
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Note: The sample is opposite-sex couples with children born in 2009, either between May 1-June 17 (control)
or July 14-August 31 (treatment). Couples must have co-resided as of January 1 2008, and the mother must be
registered with earned income in 2008.
Figure A.5: Eﬀects on pre-reform outcomes, parental leave sample. Discontinuity plots. Points
give bin-speciﬁc means, error bars give their 95 per cent conﬁdence intervals. Lines give linear
ﬁt..
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N=9 516. The sample is opposite-sex couples with children born in 2009, either between May 1-June 17 (control)
or July 14-August 31 (treatment). Couples must have co-resided as of January 1 2008, and the mother must be
registered with earned income in 2008, and siblings (if any) must be born at least 16 months before/after the
focal child.
Figure A.6: Eﬀects on pre-reform outcomes, sociodemographic sample. Discontinuity plots.
Points give bin-speciﬁc means, error bars give their 95 per cent conﬁdence intervals. Lines give
linear ﬁt.
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Note: N=9 757. The sample is opposite-sex couples with children born in 2009, either between May 1-June 17
(control) or July 14-August 31 (treatment). Couples must have co-resided as of January 1 2008, and the mother
must be registered with earned income in 2008.
Figure A.7: Reform eﬀects on leave uptake measures, placebo sample. Discontinuity plots.
Points give bin-speciﬁc means, error bars give their 95 per cent conﬁdence intervals. Lines give
linear ﬁt.
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Note: N=9 110. The sample is opposite-sex couples with children born in 2008, either between May 1-June 17
(control) or July 14-August 31 (treatment). Couples must have co-resided as of January 1 2007, and the mother
must be registered with earned income in 2007, and siblings (if any) must be born at least 16 months before/after
the focal child.
Figure A.8: Reform eﬀects on sociodemographic outcomes, placebo sample. Discontinuity plots.
Points give bin-speciﬁc means, error bars give their 95 per cent conﬁdence intervals. Lines give
linear ﬁt.
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Note: N=9 320.The sample is opposite-sex couples with children born in 2008, either between May 1-June 17
(control) or July 14-August 31 (treatment). Couples must have co-resided as of January 1 2007, and the mother
must be registered with earned income in 2007.
Figure A.9: Donut plots for uptake, placebo sample. Dots give OLS/LPM estimates from
Regression Discontinuity models and error bars their 95 per cent conﬁdence intervals.
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(d) Mean length of spell, mothers.
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(e) Father's probability of taking at least 50 work
days of leave.
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Note: N=9 110. The sample is opposite-sex couples with children born in 2008, either between May 1-June 17
(control) or July 14-August 31 (treatment). Couples must have co-resided as of January 1 2007, and the mother
must be registered with earned income in 2007, and siblings (if any) must be born at least 16 months before/after
the focal child.
Table A.1: Descriptive statistics of outcome variables. Main sample, sociodemographic out-
comes.
Mean SD P25 Median P75 Min Max
Joint characteristics
Additional sibling
N child 1y 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00
N child 2y 0,08 0,27 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 2,00
N child 3y 0,22 0,42 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 2,00
N child 4y 0,31 0,49 0,00 0,00 1,00 0,00 2,00
N child 5y 0,37 0,54 0,00 0,00 1,00 0,00 3,00
Any child 1y 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00
Any child 2y 0,07 0,26 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 1,00
Any child 3y 0,21 0,41 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 1,00
Any child 4y 0,30 0,46 0,00 0,00 1,00 0,00 1,00
Any child 5y 0,34 0,48 0,00 0,00 1,00 0,00 1,00
Union intact when
Child 1y 0,98 0,15 1,00 1,00 1,00 0,00 1,00
Child 2y 0,96 0,20 1,00 1,00 1,00 0,00 1,00
Child 3y 0,94 0,24 1,00 1,00 1,00 0,00 1,00
Child 4y 0,92 0,27 1,00 1,00 1,00 0,00 1,00
Child 5y 0,90 0,31 1,00 1,00 1,00 0,00 1,00
Mother's share earnings
Child 1y 0,38 0,19 0,27 0,38 0,47 0,00 1,00
Child 2 y 0,39 0,19 0,29 0,40 0,48 0,00 1,00
Child 3 y 0,39 0,19 0,29 0,40 0,48 0,00 1,00
Child 4 y 0,39 0,19 0,29 0,40 0,49 0,00 1,00
Child 5 y 0,40 0,19 0,30 0,40 0,49 0,00 1,00
Father characteristics
Working when
Child 1y 0,96 0,20 1,00 1,00 1,00 0,00 1,00
Child 2 y 0,96 0,20 1,00 1,00 1,00 0,00 1,00
Child 3 y 0,96 0,20 1,00 1,00 1,00 0,00 1,00
Child 4 y 0,95 0,21 1,00 1,00 1,00 0,00 1,00
Child 5 y 0,95 0,21 1,00 1,00 1,00 0,00 1,00
Log earnings when
Child 1y 12,76 1,94 12,83 13,05 13,33 0,00 16,01
Child 2 y 12,80 2,02 12,89 13,11 13,40 0,00 16,09
Child 3 y 12,83 2,12 12,95 13,17 13,45 0,00 16,01
Child 4 y 12,85 2,23 12,99 13,22 13,51 0,00 16,22
Child 5 y 12,86 2,34 13,03 13,27 13,56 0,00 16,85
Mother characteristics
Working when
Child 1y 0,91 0,28 1,00 1,00 1,00 0,00 1,00
Child 2 y 0,90 0,30 1,00 1,00 1,00 0,00 1,00
Child 3 y 0,91 0,29 1,00 1,00 1,00 0,00 1,00
Child 4 y 0,91 0,28 1,00 1,00 1,00 0,00 1,00
Child 5 y 0,91 0,29 1,00 1,00 1,00 0,00 1,00
Log earnings when
Child 1y 12,12 2,07 12,17 12,58 12,83 0,00 14,60
Child 2 y 12,06 2,58 12,33 12,73 12,96 0,00 15,32
Child 3 y 12,17 2,48 12,44 12,79 13,03 0,00 14,64
Child 4 y 12,19 2,61 12,49 12,84 13,08 0,00 15,82
Child 5 y 12,21 2,72 12,55 12,89 13,13 0,00 15,20
Note: N=9 757. The sample is opposite-sex couples with children born in 2009, either between May 1-June 17
(control) or July 14-August 31 (treatment). Couples must have co-resided as of January 1 2008, and the mother
must be registered with earned income in 2008.
Table A.2: Descriptive statistics of outcome variables. Parental leave sample.
Mean SD P25 Median P75 Min Max
Father characteristics
Leavedays 40,03 37,79 18,00 36,00 55,20 0,00 528,00
Leavedays capped 39,86 36,37 18,00 36,00 55,20 0,00 280,00
Takes compensated leave 0,78 0,42 1,00 1,00 1,00 0,00 1,00
Leave >= 50 days 0,37 0,48 0,00 0,00 1,00 0,00 1,00
Number of spells 1,10 1,51 1,00 1,00 1,00 0,00 44,00
Mean duration of spells 34,40 34,45 10,00 30,42 50,00 0,00 528,00
Uses time account 0,09 0,29 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 1,00
80% compensation 0,50 0,50 0,00 0,00 1,00 0,00 1,00
Mother characteristics
Leavedays 218,52 102,07 180,00 258,00 282,00 0,00 796,80
Leavedays capped 209,99 89,89 180,00 258,00 280,00 0,00 280,00
Takes compensated leave 0,89 0,32 1,00 1,00 1,00 0,00 1,00
Number of spells 0,94 0,42 1,00 1,00 1,00 0,00 4,00
Mean duration of spells 212,36 102,59 176,00 246,00 280,80 0,00 796,80
Uses time account 0,02 0,12 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 1,00
Note: N=9 516. The sample is opposite-sex couples with children born in 2009, either between May 1-June 17
(control) or July 14-August 31 (treatment). Couples must have co-resided as of January 1 2008, and the mother
must be registered with earned income in 2008, and siblings (if any) must be born at least 16 months before/after
the focal child.
Table A.3: Reform eﬀects on leave uptake and outcomes. Restricted sample. OLS/LPM esti-
mates from Regression Discontinuity models.
No controls Full controls
Est (SE) Est (SE)
A: LEAVE UPTAKE FATHERS
Number of days 15,53 (9,15) 16,76 (8,26) †
Use time account -0,08 (0,06) † -0,07 (0,05)
Takes leave 0,02 (0,12) 0,03 (0,10)
Mean duration of spell 8,63 (8,65) 10,48 (8,44)
Number of spells 0,26 (0,35) 0,19 (0,30)
80% compensation -0,12 (0,11) -0,13 (0,10)
B: LEAVE UPTAKE MOTHERS
Number of days -26,36 (17,44) -26,74 (19,22)
Use time account -0,04 (0,02) † -0,03 (0,02)
Takes leave -0,05 (0,07) -0,05 (0,07)
Mean duration of spell -28,17 (16,92) † -28,71 (17,61)
Number of spells -0,06 (0,09) -0,04 (0,10)
C: DEMOGRAPHIC OUTCOMES
Intact union ch. 5 y -0,04 (0,05) -0,04 (0,05)
At least one younger sibling 5 y -0,08 (0,12) -0,08 (0,10)
N younger siblings 5 y -0,07 (0,11) -0,08 (0,10)
D: EARNINGS OUTCOMES
Mothers' share ch. 5 y 0,02 (0,05) 0,02 (0,04)
Father working ch. 5 y -0,04 (0,06) -0,03 (0,05)
Father ln(earn.) ch. 5 y -0,39 (0,78) -0,31 (0,72)
Mother working ch. 5 y 0,01 (0,06) 0,01 (0,06)
Mother ln(earn.) ch. 5 y -0,21 (0,58) -0,12 (0,46)
Note: N=3 358 for the parental leave sample and 3 450 for the sociodemographic sample. The sample is opposite-
sex couples with children born in 2009, either between June 1-June 17 (control) or July 14-July31 (treatment).
Couples must have co-resided as of January 1 2008, and the mother must be registered with earned income in
2008. In the parental leave sample, siblings (if any) must be born at least 16 months before/after the focal child.
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, † p<0.1.
Table A.4: Reform eﬀects on leave uptake and outcomes. Extended sample. OLS/LPM esti-
mates from Regression Discontinuity models.
No controls Full controls
Est SE Est SE
A: LEAVE UPTAKE FATHERS
Number of days 14,83 (2,27) *** 15,06 (2,06) ***
Use time account 0,02 (0,02) 0,02 (0,02)
Takes leave 0,02 (0,03) 0,01 (0,02)
Takes >= 50 days leave 0,53 (0,03) *** 0,53 (0,03) ***
Mean duration of spell 11,51 (1,95) *** 11,74 (2,03) ***
Number of spells 0,03 (0,11) 0,03 (0,11)
80% compensation -0,07 (0,03) * -0,07 (0,03) *
B: LEAVE UPTAKE MOTHERS
Number of days -14,77 (5,11) ** -14,75 (5,17) **
Use time account 0,00 (0,01) 0,00 (0,01)
Takes leave -0,01 (0,02) -0,01 (0,02)
Mean duration of spell -15,50 (6,53) * -15,72 (6,62) *
Number of spells -0,03 (0,02) -0,03 (0,02)
C: DEMOGRAPHIC OUTCOMES
Intact union ch. 5 y 0,00 (0,02) 0,00 (0,02)
At least one younger sibling 5 y 0,00 (0,03) -0,02 (0,03)
N younger siblings 5 y 0,00 (0,04) -0,02 (0,03)
D: EARNINGS OUTCOMES
Mothers' share ch. 5 y 0,02 (0,01) 0,01 (0,01)
Father working ch. 5 y -0,02 (0,01) -0,01 (0,01)
Father ln(earn.) ch. 5 y -0,17 (0,15) -0,14 (0,14)
Mother working ch. 5 y 0,00 (0,02) 0,00 (0,02)
Mother ln(earn.) ch. 5 y 0,02 (0,18) 0,05 (0,17)
Note: N=20 872 in the parental leave sample and 21 421 in the sociodemographic sample. The sample is
opposite-sex couples with children born in 2009, either between March 1-June 17 (control) or July 14- October
31 (treatment). Couples must have co-resided as of January 1 2008, and the mother must be registered with
earned income in 2008. In the parental leave sample, siblings (if any) must be born at least 16 months before/after
the focal child.. *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05,† p<0.1.
Table A.5: Reform eﬀects on leave uptake and outcomes. Simpler speciﬁcations OLS/LPM
estimates from Regression Discontinuity models.
Dummy Linear Square
Est SE Est SE Est SE
A: LEAVE UPTAKE FATHERS
Number of days 13,95 (0,66) *** 15,39 (1,51) *** 15,43 (1,51) ***
Takes leave 0,01 (0,01) 0,00 (0,02) 0,00 (0,02)
Takes >= 50 days leave 0,51 (0,01) *** 0,54 (0,02) *** 0,54 (0,02) ***
80% compensation -0,10 (0,01) *** -0,07 (0,02) *** -0,07 (0,02) ***
B: LEAVE UPTAKE MOTHERS
Number of days -15,64 (1,79) *** -16,74 (3,17) *** -16,55 (3,11) ***
Takes leave -0,01 (0,01) -0,02 (0,01) * -0,02 (0,01) *
C: DEMOGRAPHIC OUTCOMES
Intact union ch. 5 y -0,01 (0,01) 0,00 (0,01) 0,00 (0,01)
At least one younger sibling 5 y 0,01 (0,01) 0,02 (0,02) 0,02 (0,02)
D: EARNINGS OUTCOMES
Mothers' share ch. 5 y 0,01 (0,00) 0,01 (0,01) 0,01 (0,01)
Father working ch. 5 y 0,00 (0,00) -0,01 (0,01) -0,01 (0,01)
Father ln(earn.) ch. 5 y -0,03 (0,05) -0,06 (0,10) -0,07 (0,10)
Mother working ch. 5 y 0,00 (0,01) 0,00 (0,01) 0,00 (0,01)
Mother ln(earn.) ch. 5 y -0,01 (0,05) -0,01 (0,09) -0,01 (0,09)
Note: N=9 516 for the parental leave sample and 9 757 for the sociodemographic sample. The samples are
opposite-sex couples with children born in 2009, either between May 1-June 17 (control) or July 14-August 31
(treatment). Couples must have co-resided as of January 1 2008, and the mother must be registered with earned
income in 2008. In the parental leave sample, siblings (if any) must be born at least 16 months before/after the
focal child. *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, † p<0.1.
Table A.6: Descriptive statistics of outcome variables. Placebo analysis sample.
Mean SD P25 Median P75 Min Max
A: LEAVE UPTAKE FATHERS
Number of days 33,12 32,26 15,00 36,00 36,00 0,00 280,00
Use time account 0,06 0,24 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 1,00
Takes leave 0,77 0,42 1,00 1,00 1,00 0,00 1,00
Takes >= 50 days leave 0,12 0,32 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 1,00
Mean duration of spell 29,08 30,63 7,20 30,00 36,00 0,00 455,00
Number of spells 1,08 1,52 1,00 1,00 1,00 0,00 30,00
80% compensation 0,56 0,50 0,00 1,00 1,00 0,00 1,00
B: LEAVE UPTAKE MOTHERS
Number of days 0,01 0,11 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 1,00
Use time account 217,13 92,81 189,00 276,00 280,00 0,00 280,00
Takes leave 0,88 0,33 1,00 1,00 1,00 0,00 1,00
Mean duration of spell 222,59 108,06 185,00 272,40 288,00 0,00 1304,40
Number of spells 0,93 0,53 1,00 1,00 1,00 0,00 31,00
C: DEMOGRAPHIC OUTCOMES
Intact union ch. 5 y 0,90 0,30 1,00 1,00 1,00 0,00 1,00
At least one younger sibling 5 y 0,29 0,45 0,00 0,00 1,00 0,00 1,00
N younger siblings 5 y 0,31 0,50 0,00 0,00 1,00 0,00 3,00
D: EARNINGS OUTCOMES
Mothers' share ch. 5 y 0,39 0,19 0,29 0,40 0,48 0,00 1,00
Father working ch. 5 y 0,95 0,21 1,00 1,00 1,00 0,00 1,00
Father ln(earn.) ch. 5 y 12,86 2,27 13,01 13,24 13,52 0,00 15,90
Mother working ch. 5 y 0,91 0,29 1,00 1,00 1,00 0,00 1,00
Mother ln(earn.) ch. 5 y 12,16 2,70 12,51 12,85 13,09 0,00 15,62
Note: N=9 110 for parental leave outcomes and 9 320 for sociodemographic outcomes. The sample is opposite-sex
couples with children born in 2008, either between May 1-June 17 or July 15-August 31. Couples must have
co-resided as of January 1 2007, and the mother must be registered with earned income in 2007. For parental
leave outcomes, siblings (if any) must be born at least 16 months before/after the focal child.
Table A.7: Mean diﬀerences by treatment status. Outcome variables. Parental leave placebo
sample (Panel A) and sociodemographic placebo sample (Panel B)
Panel A: Parental leave outcomes
Post Pre Post - Pre
Father's days of leave (org.) 32.84 33.44 -0.60
Father's days of leave 32.83 33.38 -0.55
Father takes leave 0.77 0.77 0.00
Father takes >=10 weeks 0.11 0.12 -0.01
Father N leave spells 1.05 1.10 -0.05
Father mean duration spell 29.00 29.15 -0.15
Father uses time account 0.06 0.06 0.00
Father 80% compensation 0.53 0.58 -0.05∗∗∗
Mother's days of leave (org.) 227.09 230.17 -3.08
Mother's days of leave 216.39 217.84 -1.46
Mother takes leave 0.88 0.87 0.01
Mother N leave spells 0.94 0.93 0.02
Mother mean duration spell 221.04 224.07 -3.03
Mother uses time account 0.01 0.01 0.00
Observations 9110
Panel B: Sociodemographic outcomes
Post Pre Post - Pre
Union intact 2y 0.98 0.97 0.00
Union intact 5y 0.90 0.90 0.00
Mother's share 2y 0.38 0.38 -0.00
Mother's share 5y 0.39 0.39 -0.00
Father working 2y 0.96 0.96 0.00
Father working 5y 0.96 0.95 0.00
Father ln(earn) 2y 12.80 12.80 -0.00
Father ln(earn) 5y 12.89 12.83 0.06
Mother working 2y 0.91 0.90 0.01
Mother working 5y 0.91 0.91 -0.00
Mother ln(earn) 2y 12.05 11.98 0.07
Mother ln(earn) 5y 12.15 12.17 -0.01
N younger sibs 5y 0.30 0.31 -0.01
Has younger sib 5y 0.28 0.29 -0.01
Observations 9320
Note: N=9 110 for parental leave outcomes and 9 320 for sociodemographic outcomes. The sample is opposite-sex
couples with children born in 2008, either between May 1-June 17 (control) or July 14-August 31 (treatment).
Couples must have co-resided as of January 1 2007, and the mother must be registered with earned income in
2007. In the parental leave sample, siblings (if any) must be born at least 16 months before/after the focal child.
Table A.8: Reform eﬀects on leave uptake and outcomes. Placebo sample. OLS/LPM estimates
from Regression Discontinuity models.
No controls Full controls
Est (SE) Est (SE)
A: LEAVE UPTAKE FATHERS
Number of days 2,25 (3,75) 3,81 (3,51)
Use time account -0,04 (0,03) † -0,04 (0,03) †
Takes leave -0,02 (0,05) 0,01 (0,05)
Takes >= 50 days leave 0,03 (0,03) 0,02 (0,03)
Mean duration of spell 2,11 (3,47) 3,30 (3,27)
Number of spells -0,09 (0,17) -0,07 (0,16)
80% compensation -0,07 (0,05) -0,06 (0,05)
B: LEAVE UPTAKE MOTHERS
Number of days -19,84 (10,88) * -13,42 (10,00)
Use time account 0,00 (0,01) 0,00 (0,01)
Takes leave -0,06 (0,04) † -0,04 (0,04)
Mean duration of spell -28,25 (14,29) * -20,36 (13,26)
Number of spells -0,06 (0,05) -0,03 (0,04)
C: DEMOGRAPHIC OUTCOMES
Intact union ch. 5 y 0,03 (0,04) 0,03 (0,04)
At least one younger sibling 5 y -0,03 (0,04) -0,04 (0,04)
N younger siblings 5 y -0,05 (0,05) -0,05 (0,04)
D: EARNINGS OUTCOMES
Mothers' share ch. 5 y 0,01 (0,02) 0,02 (0,02)
Father working ch. 5 y 0,01 (0,02) 0,01 (0,02)
Father ln(earn.) ch. 5 y -0,01 (0,22) 0,03 (0,19)
Mother working ch. 5 y 0,03 (0,03) 0,04 (0,03)
Mother ln(earn.) ch. 5 y 0,19 (0,31) 0,30 (0,30)
Note: N=9 110 for parental leave outcomes and 9 320 for sociodemographic outcomes. The sample is opposite-sex
couples with children born in 2008, either between May 1-June 17 (control) or July 14-August 31 (treatment).
Couples must have co-resided as of January 1 2007, and the mother must be registered with earned income in
2007. In the parental leave sample, siblings (if any) must be born at least 16 months before/after the focal child.
Table A.9: Mean diﬀerences by treatment status, placebo sample. Balancing tests on pre-reform
characteristics. Parental leave sample (Panel A) and sociodemographic sample (Panel B)
Panel A: Parental leave placebo sample
Post Pre Post - Pre
Married 0.47 0.48 -0.01
Parity 2.05 2.04 0.01
Mother's age 32.37 32.53 -0.16
Mother's earnings 289564.33 289402.41 161.92
Mother basic educ. 0.12 0.12 0.00
Mother HS educ. 0.28 0.29 -0.01
Mother higher educ., lower degr. 0.45 0.45 -0.00
Mother higher educ., higher degr. 0.13 0.13 -0.00
Mother missing educ. 0.02 0.02 0.00
Mother student 0.10 0.08 0.01∗
Father's age 35.20 35.13 0.07
Father's earnings 454011.31 448712.07 5299.25
Father basic educ. 0.17 0.16 0.01
Father HS educ. 0.40 0.41 -0.01
Father higher educ., lower degr. 0.28 0.27 0.00
Father higher educ., higher degr. 0.14 0.15 -0.00
Father missing educ. 0.01 0.02 -0.00
Father student 0.06 0.06 0.00
Observations 9110
Panel B: Sociodemographic placebo sample
Post Pre Post - Pre
Married 0.47 0.48 -0.01
Parity 2.06 2.05 0.01
Mother's age 32.35 32.48 -0.14
Mother's earnings 288807.94 288196.87 611.07
Mother basic educ. 0.12 0.12 0.00
Mother HS educ. 0.29 0.29 -0.01
Mother higher educ., lower degr. 0.45 0.44 0.00
Mother higher educ., higher degr. 0.12 0.12 -0.00
Mother missing educ. 0.02 0.02 0.00
Mother student 0.10 0.08 0.01∗
Father's age 35.17 35.10 0.07
Father's earnings 452996.61 447523.37 5473.24
Father basic educ. 0.17 0.16 0.01
Father HS educ. 0.40 0.41 -0.01
Father higher educ., lower degr. 0.28 0.27 0.01
Father higher educ., higher degr. 0.14 0.14 -0.00
Father missing educ. 0.01 0.02 -0.00
Father student 0.06 0.06 -0.00
Observations 9320
Note: Note: N=9 110 for parental leave outcomes and 9 320 for sociodemographic outcomes. The sample is
opposite-sex couples with children born in 2008, either between May 1-June 17 (control) or July 14-August 31
(treatment). Couples must have co-resided as of January 1 2007, and the mother must be registered with earned
income in 2007. In the parental leave sample, siblings (if any) must be born at least 16 months before/after the
focal child.
Appendix II: Details on data and sample for parental leave
outcomes
Parental leave data are obtained from the FD Trygd Database (Akselsen et al., 2007), which contains
information on receipt of a range of social transfers. FD Trygd consists of spells of transfer reciept.
One parent's leave after one birth can be composed of more than one spell. Spells are registered to
parents, and must be linked to children by assumptions. With a maximum leave length of 56 (46) weeks
at 80 (100) percent compensation, and few alternatives to parental care for children under 1 year in
Norway, the vast majority of leave is taken within the ﬁrst 1.5 year of the child's life (Fougner, 2012).
We assign leave spells to a child if the following two criteria are met:
1. The leave starts no earlier than the birth date (for fathers) or no earlier than [three] weeks
before the birth date (for mothers). Fathers cannot take leave before a child is born. Norwegian
expectant mothers are mandated by law to start their parental leave no later than three weeks
before their due date. Births are medically induced 12 days past due date the latest (https:
//helsedirektoratet.no/retningslinjer/svangerskapsomsorgen). Leaving some time for the
birth to happen, the maximum duration between leave start and birth date should hence be ﬁve
weeks.
2. The leave starts no later than 13 months and three weeks after the child is born.
The second restriction assigns leave spells accurately if children with a sibling born within 16 months
of own birth are excluded from the sample. Hence, analysis of parental leave outcomes are done on
a sample that is strictly speaking endogenously conditioned with respect to fertility spacing, and we
estimate eﬀects only for the subsample of children with no closely spaced sibling. Children with closely
spaced siblings diﬀer systematically from children with siblings born further apart, faring somewhat
worse on a range of health outcomes (Conde-Agudelo et al., 2006).
It is reassuring that we ﬁnd no empirical evidence of endogeneity with respect to fertility: Our
estimates show that the reform does not aﬀect fertility, and robustsness tests show no diﬀerences between
the treatment and control groups with respect to pre-reform fertility. Still, we perform analysis on
sociodemographic outcomes in a separate sample that is not restricted by this endogenous conditions.
